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ARTICLES

THE LAW REGULATING UNSOLICITED
COMMERCIAL E-MAIL: AN INTERNATIONAL
PERSPECTIVE
John Mageet

Advertising is a valuable economic factor because it is the cheapest
way of selling goods, particularly if the goods are worthless.
-Sinclair

Lewis (1885-195 1)

Advertisements on the current Internet computer network are not
common because of the network's not-for-profit origins.
-Trotter

I.

Hardy, The ProperLegal Regime for "Cyberspace," 1994

INTRODUCTION

The sending of unsolicited commercial e-mail, or spam, to
Internet users has been a major problem since the early days of the
Internet. By shifting the costs involved with the sending of bulk email, unscrupulous advertisers have been able to mass market their
products for a nominal cost and in doing so, have attracted the wrath
of individual users, Internet service providers and various interested
groups, agencies and organizations. A cursory examination of some
t John Magee BCL, LLM [jonnermagee@yahoo.com] is from Dublin, Ireland. He studied Law
at University College Dublin before going on to complete a Master's degree in Computers and
Law at the Queen's University, Belfast. The author would like to thank Dr. Philip Leith at
Queen's University, Prof Giovanni Sartor at the University of Bologna, and Aoife Brophy of
Trinity College Dublin for all of their generous assistance during the writing of this Article.
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of the statistics associated with unsolicited commercial e-mail is a
helpful starting point in identifying some of the problems associated
with this phenomenon and its regulation. A 1998 Novell report
estimated that the annual cost of spam to British and Irish business, in
terms of wasted time, was in the region of £5 billion.1 The European
Commission proposes a figure of €10 billion per year as the cost of
spam to Internet users worldwide. 2 With regard to volume, Ian Lloyd
notes that some 3.4 trillion e-mails were sent in the U.S. in 1998.? Of
these, 2.7 trillion were commercial in nature, 96% of which could be
regarded as spam.4 Brightmail, a spam-filter company, has noted a
recent sharp rise in the volume of spam being sent, estimating a 100%
increase in the first half of 2002. 5 This trend accords with the
findings of Jupiter Media Matrix, an Internet-based market researcher,
who predict that 206 billion unsolicited commercial e-mails will be
junk esent in the U.S. in 2006-this figure corresponds
6 to 1,400
mails per Internet user, compared to 700 this year.
The most striking aspect of these statistics is the staggering
volume of unsolicited commercial e-mail being disseminated annually
and there follows the additional issue of being able to calculate the
size of the problem in hand. In this regard, most parties affected by
the problem of junk e-mail have adopted the pragmatic mindset of
concentrating their efforts on the control of the problem, rather than
undertaking the near-impossible task of calculating the exact cost of
it, an approach which will be followed throughout this Article.
Perhaps a greater problem which emerges from the above statistics is
that of the classification and definition of spam e-mail. Wye-Keen
Khong 7 notes that the utopian definition of spam will include all e-

1. James Glave, Novell Spam Report Boomerangs, WIRED NEWS, Apr. 29, 1998,
availableat http://www.wired.com/news/print/0,1294,11994,00.html.
2.
EUROPEAN COMMISSION, COMMISSION STUDY: JUNK E-MAIL COSTS INTERNET
USERS EURO 10 BILLION A YEAR WORLDWIDE 9 (2001), available at
http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal-market/en/dataprot/studies/spam.htm.
3.

IAN J. LLOYD, INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY LAW § 28.13 (3d ed. 2000).

4.
As a point of comparison, the U.S. Postal Service delivered 107 billion letters and
parcels in the same year. Id.
5.
Jane Black, Special Report: The E-Mail Monster: The High Price of Spare, BUSINESS
WEEK ONLINE, Mar. 1, 2002, at
http://www.businessweek.com/technology/content/mar2002/tc2002031_8613.htm?tc.
6.

Charlie Taylor, Can the Spain, NUA, Mar. 25, 2002, at

http://www.nua.ie/surveys/analysis/weekly_editorial/archives/issues lno219.html.
Wye-Keen Khong, Regulating Spams on the Internet, in 15th BILETA Conference:
7.
Electronic Datasets and Access to Legal Information, Apr. 14, 2000 (transcript available at
http://www.bileta.ac.uk/00papers/khong.htm).
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mails which are of no benefit to the recipient from the point of view
of the recipient. But this quickly becomes problematic when looked
at in practical terms. The first barrier that can be identified occurs
when one attempts to control 'unsolicited bulk e-mail' as has been
attempted in Australia. 8 By classifying spam as all e-mail that is both
unsolicited and bulk in nature, restrictive regulation is likely to
conflict with the rights of citizens' free speech, where the e-mail in
question is not commercial in nature. As will be seen below, this has
caused legal difficulties for anti-spam legislation in the U.S., where
the degree of constitutional protection for commercial speech is lower
than that for political speech. Khong also notes that definitional
problems subsist when the term "unsolicited commercial e-mail" is
applied. 9 He correctly notes that different jurisdictions may apply
widely different interpretations to the term "commercial." '10 The
problem is particularly acute when attempting to define traditionally
public services, such as education or health care, which may have
been semi-privatized and for which a fee is paid.
One major concern of legislators within the European Union is
that the negative publicity surrounding unsolicited commercial e-mail
will impinge directly upon the legitimate activities of bona fide online
commercial enterprises. M.Y. Schaub has argued that, in time, the
direct e-mail marketing to previous customers by online businesses
may become a widely accepted marketing tool, on the premise that if
a consumer has obtained goods or services from a particular retailer,
he may be interested to hear of future offers of similar goods or
services from the same company." Further problems emerge when
online purchases give rise to the divulging of the consumer's e-mail
address to third-party companies, who may or may not use the address
for legitimate commercial purposes.
Given all these problems, the author proposes the following
definition. Taken from a report on Electronic Mailing and Data
Protection, the Commission Nationale de L'Informatique et des
Libert6s, an independent French commission, defines spam as:
The practice of sending unsolicited e-mails, most frequently of a
commercial nature, in large numbers and repeatedly to individuals
8. Definitions of Words We Use, Coalition Against Unsolicited Bulk E-mail, Australia,
Web site, at http://www.caube.org.au/whatis.htm (last visited Feb. 9, 2003) (defining UBE).
9. Khong, supra note 7.
10.
Id.
11. M. Y. Schaub, Unsolicited Email: Does Europe Allow Sparn? The State of the Art of
the European Legislation with Regard to Unsolicited Commercial Communications, 18
COMPUTER L. & SEC. REP. 99 (2002).
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with whom the sender has no precious contact, and whose e-mail
Internet, such as
address may be found in a public place on the
12
newsgroups, mailing lists, directory or website.
Following a brief history of spain and a discussion of the
problems it creates and of those who are affected, this Article
proposes to trace the origins of the law with regard to spain, to assess
its merits, and to discuss what may occur in the future. While the
perspective will be that of a researcher from Europe, where the
discussion on spain has been thrown open once more in light of the
proposed Electronic Communications Privacy Directive, 13 due
attention will be paid to the laws of the U.S., where the majority of
the world's spain originates, as well as to other international
jurisdictions. Due to the fact that spammers are generally unable to
ascertain the geographical whereabouts of their audience, the state of
the law in the U.S. is therefore of global relevance. In this light, the
efforts of various international organizations to co-ordinate the laws
of national and supra-national legislatures will also be discussed.
Various legal approaches will be considered, including the common
law, legislation and self-regulation as well as the non-legal, technical
solutions which are becoming more prevalent today.
II. UNSOLICITED COMMERCIAL E-MAIL

A.

A BriefHistory

The precise manner in which the term spain came into current
usage has become a great source of debate amongst hardcore Internet
geeks and hackers. The term probably originated in the mid-1980's
following an incident in which a MU.S.H (multi-user shared
hallucination) 14 user caused technical difficulties by creating a macro
which repeatedly typed the word "SPAM. ' 1 5 The prankster may have
been inspired by a Monty Python comedy sketch that takes place in a
restaurant where every meal on the menu contains spain, an
unpalatable tinned meat product for which Hormel Foods owns the

12.
Commission Nationale de lnformatique et des Libert6s, Report of October 14, 1999,
availableat http://www.cnil.fr.

13.

Commission Proposal for a Council Directive on the Processing of Personal Data and

the Protection of Privacy in the Electronic Communications Sector, 2002 O.J. (CI13E) 39

[hereinafter Commission Proposal on Protection of Privacy].
14.
A MU.S.H is a type of MUD (multi-user dimension). David E. Sorkin, Technical and
LegalApproaches to UnsolicitedElectronic Mail, 35 U.S.F. L. REV. 325, 325 n.2 (2001).

15.

Id.
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U.S. trademark,' 6 and to which some commentators directly link
current usage of the word. 7 In any case, the term spam came to be
applied to articles posted to Usenet newsgroups which were of no
relevance to the discussion involved and which violated forum
policies and rules of custom. 18 Such articles were often cross-posted
to many newsgroups and quickly became a nuisance-so much so
that at one point, the number of genuine articles were outnumbered by
spam messages.' 9 Gradually, the term spam became used to describe
junk e-mail messages, generally advertisements for products and
services of a dubious nature. Although the term has been applied to
unwanted telephone 20 and fax 2' messages as well as to the repetition
of words on a Web page to enhance the opportunity for retrieval by
search engine, 22 the term spam is today synonymous with unsolicited
commercial e-mail.
Coinciding with the rise in the use of the Internet as a
commercial medium, the first instances of spamming occurred in
1993. A U.S. couple, Lawrence Canter and Martha Siegel, retain the
dubious honor of being the first large-scale spammers. 23 Their
advertisement, publicizing a green card employment scheme, was
posted to thousands of newsgroups within a short space of time. The
public reaction was swift and decisive. Users began to mail bomb the
couple's e-mail address, causing their mailbox to overload and
probably preventing any genuine potential clients from contacting the
couple. 24 Other users complained to the network service provider
involved while other, more technically-minded netizens attempted to
create a piece of software capable of automatically identifying and
deleting the advertisements. Whatever the individual retaliatory
approaches taken, the message from Internet users was clear: any

16.

Spain Web site, at http://www.spam.com (last visited Feb. 8, 2003).

17.
See David T. Bartels, Review of Selected 1998 California Legislation: Canning
Spain: CaliforniaBans Unsolicited Commercial E-mail, 30 MCGEORGE L. REV. 420, 420 n. I
(1999).

18. Lloyd L. Rich, Internet Legal Issues: SPAM, PUBLISHING LAW CENTRE, 1999,
available at http://www.publaw.com/spam.html (last visited Feb. 9, 2003).
19.

LLOYD, supranote 3, § 28.14.

20.
B. Foss, Blasts Filling Voice Mail: A
Communicate?, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 11, 1999.

Nuisance, or an Efficient Way to

21.
Drew Cullen, LA Citizens Tackle NFL in Mass Fax Spam, THE REGISTER, Aug. 25,
1999, at http://wwwthergister.co.uk/content/archive/6369.html.

22.

Ira S. Nathenson, Internet Infoglut and Invisible Ink: Spamdexing Search Engines

with Meta Tags, 12 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 43, 46-47 (1998).

23.
24.

Khong, supranote 7.
Id.
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breach of behavioral norms on the Internet (known colloquially as
"netiquette") 25 would result in punishment. The development of this
vigilante regulation into a more sophisticated body of law will be
discussed later in this section. Beforehand, the primary issue of the
type of damage caused by unsolicited commercial e-mail, as well as
the main parties affected, will be addressed.
B. Problemswith Unsolicited CommercialE-Mail
At the heart of this issue lies a contradiction. In attempting to
strike a balance between the rights of commercial entrepreneurs to
market their wares and the rights of e-mail users to be free from
unwarranted solicitation, a clear contradiction exists between business
interests and those of private individuals.26 Although it would appear
difficult as to where to draw the line in this regard, it seems that
instances of e-mail users receiving upwards of four spams for every
one legitimate e-mail 27 should tip the balance in favor of the
protection of the individual. The main problem with unsolicited
commercial e-mail and the reason for its proliferation is the shifting
of the costs involved away from the advertiser onto the consumer and
other parties. Unlike passive forms of advertising, such as television
commercials or billboards, direct marketing usually involves some
degree of effort or involvement on the part of the consumer.
However, unlike door to door sales or other cheaper forms of direct
marketing, such as telephone and fax solicitation, the cost of sending
an e-mail is negligible and does not rise in proportion to the number
of solicitations made. 28 This fact has enabled, even encouraged,
marketers to send out as many copies of their e-mail as possible, a
figure often running into the millions. Internet users incur the costs of
these e-mails by spending time online sifting through, identifying, and
deleting the messages and may also incur further costs in attempting
to unsubscribe from the marketers' mailing lists. If, as was the case
for the unfortunate plaintiff in Parker v. C.N. Enterprises, the
spammer elected to forge a return e-mail address which corresponds
to that of an unsuspecting Internet user or server, that person will

25.
Memorandum from Sally Hambridge, Network Working Group, to the Internet
Community
on
Netiquette
Guidelines
(Oct.
1995),
available
at

http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1855.txt (last visited Feb. 10, 2003).
26. Schaub, supra note 11.
27.

P. Freeman, Telecom Issues Top Consumer Complaints, PUGET SOUND Bus. J., Oct.

2, 1998, at 26.
28.
Michael A. Fisher, The Right to Spam? Regulating Electronic Junk Mail, 23 COLUM.VLA J.L. & ARTS 363, 364 (2000).
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receive all of the returned mail which had been sent to incorrect
addresses.2 9 In Parker, the number of returned messages numbered
tens of thousands.30
Apart from the end consumer, the other major victims are the
Internet service providers (ISPs) who process the e-mails. Servers
quickly become clogged when inundated with the large volume of
mail associated with spams-massive amounts of bandwidth and
memory are consumed and associated administrative costs are
incurred. 3' Although ISPs may suffer a loss of business and, indeed,
reputation due to continued clogged bandwidth as a result of relaying
spam, the costs in increasing bandwidth to deal with spam will simply
be passed on to the consumer in the form of higher access fees. This
problem has become so acute that some Web sites are beginning to
discontinue free e-mail services. David Sorkin argues that if spain
continues to increase exponentially in years to come, the increase in
cost could lead to the demise of e-mail as the near-universal
communication method it is today.32
Aside from the issue of volume, consumers often take exception
to the content of spain advertisements. As noted above, the goods or
services offered for sale are frequently of a dubious nature 33 and often
involve pornography or get-rich-quick pyramid schemes.34 It is not
hard to imagine the offense that these often borderline legal messages
may cause to many Internet users, and the fact that sexually explicit
material may be sent to minors and children is a cause of alarm for
many parents.
A broader sociological issue raised by this
phenomenon, and one addressed briefly by Tibor Beke, is the
question as to how this type of advertising has become so prevalent
on a medium where the level of income and education of its users has
been shown to be higher than the median.35 Another problem with

29.
30.
(1999).

Parker v. C.N. Enter., No. 97-06273 (D. Tex. 1997).
DENiS KELLEHER & KAREN MURRAY, IT LAW IN THE EUROPEAN UNION § 9.27

31.

Khong, supra note 7.

32.

Sorkin, supra note 14, at 338-39.

33.

A recent humorous article in the Onion poked fun at the general content nature of

spam advertisements.
See generally Anti-Spain Legislation Opposed by Powerful PenisEnlargement Lobby, THE ONION, July 17, 2002.

34.

The author has been the recipient of numerous junk mails which begin with the words

THIS IS NOT A PYRAMID SCHEME and which go on to describe in depth the operation of a

classic pyramid scheme, illegal in many jurisdictions.
35.
Tibor Beke, Fending Off Automated Mass Electronic Mail: or, How to Distinguish
Yourself
from
a
Computer,
FIRST
MONDAY
(1998),
at

http://www.firstmonday.dk/issues/issue3_2/beke/ (last visited Feb. 10, 2003).
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spam content arises when attached files are found to contain hostile
viruses, such as occurred with the infamous Melissa Virus in 1999.36
Looked at in this context, spain can also be categorized as a security
threat.37
Different jurisdictions identify different problems with spam.
An interesting perspective is the German one, not in the least given
that country's influence in the European legislative sphere. N.
Harting gives a good account of the development of German law on
unsolicited commercial e-mail stemming from existing law on phone
and fax marketing. As well as focusing on problems such as cost,
time, and wasted effort, Harting identifies invasion of privacy,
disruption of market relations, and the anti-competitive nature of free
38
e-mail marketing as problems that legislation should address.
Indeed, Germany remains the only European country to have had a
court ruling on the issue of spam. 39 The issue of privacy remains an
interesting one. In an age where many citizens have dispensed with
notions of familial and personal privacy, 40 it is interesting to reflect on
the writings of modem German philosophers such as Jurgen
Habermas, 1 who recognize the existence of a private sphere of life, as
distinct from the collective interests of the public sphere, today
manifested by digital mass communication media such as the
Internet.42
All of these factors taken together and compounded by the
proliferation of ISPs, Internet cafes, (where the user has no direct
contract with a service provider and thus can retain anonymity) 43 and

36. For a good article on the Melissa Virus, see the Web page of the Carnegie Mellon
University Software Engineering Institute. Carnegie Mellon University Software Engineering
Institute,
Frequently
Asked
Questions
about
the
Melissa
Virus,
at
wwwcert.org/tech-tips/MelissaFAQ.html (last visited Feb. 10, 2003).
37. Sorkin, supranote 14, at 336.
38. N. Harting, Internet Recht, Verlog Dr. Otto Schmidt, Koln (1999).
39. BeschluB des Landgerichts Traunstein [trial court], 2HK 0 3755/97 (Oct. 14, 1997).
The decision will be discussed in Part IV.
40. Diane Rowland, Anonymity, Privacy and Cyberspace, in 15th BILETA Conference:
Electronic Datasets and Access to
Legal Information (2000), available at
http://www.bileta.ac.uk/00papers/rowland.html (last visited Feb. 10, 2003).
41. See JURGEN HABERMAS, THE STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE PUBLIC
SPHERE: AN INQUIRY INTO A CATEGORY OF BOURGEOIS SOCIETY, (Thomas Burger trans., 1989)
(1962).
42. For a good article on privacy and the law in cyberspace, see Debra A. Valentine,
General Counsel, Federal Trade Commission, Privacy on the Internet: The Evolving Legal
Landscape, Prepared Remarks at Before Santa Clara University (February 11-12, 2000)
(transcript available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/other/dvsantaclaraspeech.htm).
43. LLOYD, supra note 3, at § 28.16.
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mail relay servers amount to quite a sizeable problem. The additional
effects of spam have served to disrupt mainstream e-commerce and
other businesses to an incalculable degree. Reports even indicate that
certain U.S. Internet service providers and systems administrators
have been banning all unknown e-mail from large portions of Asia,
where it is believed that unregulated servers are being used to relay
spam to the U.S. 44 The effects of this type of move serve only to
shatter confidence in the e-commerce sector and point to the need for
an over-arching legal framework as the only solution to the problem.
As Gary Moorefield puts it, "[t]he question is not whether the
medium of UCE [Unsolicited Commercial E-mail] messages serves
some good; the question is whether the drawbacks of this medium of
commercial expression outweigh the benefits to a degree that
necessitates government intervention and control. ' '4
The stark need for government control becomes only clearer
when one examines the piecemeal and unaccountable self-regulatory
procedures that sprang up to deal with the problem of spam when it
first presented itself.
C. The Move Away From Self-Regulation
As mentioned above, the first major cases of spamming, such as
the Canter and Siegel episode, aroused the wrath of Internet users
who used various techniques to retaliate to the unwarranted
interference with their Web space. Most popular amongst these was
the use of mail bombs--computer programs capable of sending and
re-sending many thousands of e-mails to a particular account, usually
46
clogging it.
Complaints were also made to the spammer's ISP and
this usually resulted in the expulsion of the spammer. The spammers
themselves, however, quickly became more sophisticated and began
to forge false return addresses in their e-mail headers,47 with the result
that any attempts to retaliate would lead to the clogging of an
innocent user's account or even the crippling of a small ISP. For this
reason, the vigilante response is described by Michael Fisher as a
44. Mark Webber, Spam Flood PromptsNew Barriers,WORLD EBUSINESS LAW REPORT,
Apr. 11, 2002, available at http://www.cptech.org/ecom/spam/spam-flood2.html.
45.
Gary S. Moorefield, SPA M-It 's Not Justfor Breakfast Anymore: FederalLegislation
and the Fight to Free the Internetfrom Unsolicited Commercial E-mail, 5 B.U. J.SC. & TECH.

L. 10, 10 (1999).
46. Fisher, supra note 28, at 399.
47. See Ken Lucke, Reading Email Headers (1997), at
http://www.stopspam.org/email/headers/headers.html (last visited Feb. 10, 2003) for an
excellent general introduction to e-mail headers.
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"blunt and inaccurate tool. 'A8 Aside from individual retaliatory
methods, anti-spain groups have been established with the aim of
stigmatizing spammers into submission. Groups such as the Coalition
50
49
Against Unsolicited Commercial E-Mail (CAUCE), Junkbusters
and the Mail Abuse Prevention System (MAPS) 5 1 offer users legal
and technical advice on how to combat spai and engage in lobbying
activities. MAPS maintains what it terms the "Realtime Blackhole
List," a blacklist of servers that are not anti-spam and which are
available to other ISPs so that they may block mail from these
networks.
This practice raises a number of problems. Firstly, the
MAPS blacklist is based on a definition of spam (involving the lack
of a double opt-in system) that MAPS itself produced. This means
that conscientious e-mail marketers who honor single opt-in or even
opt-out schemes, will nonetheless be blacklisted under MAPS' terms.
Another problem with this type of blacklist is that if one user sends
spain from an ISP, all users from the same ISP will be blacklisted,
with the consequence that much legitimate e-mail is blocked.53 A
further problem with blacklists and the self-help response to spain in
general is the lack of accountability involved and the fact that such
systems are widely open to abuse. For instance, one could imagine
the ease with which a political rival or a commercial competitor could
anonymously or by pseudonym denounce a particular individual or
company as a spammer, thus removing that person's ability to
communicate via e-mail. 54 When one considers what is at stake-the
right to communicate or trade-it is not surprising that many
commentators balk at the notion of such regulation being enforced by
a faceless, private Internet company, with no right of recourse or

48. Fisher, supra note 28, at 400.
49. See http://www.cauce.org (last visited Feb. 10, 2003); EuroCAUCE, at
http://www.euro.cauce.org/ (last visited Feb. 10, 2003).
50. See http://www.junkbusters.com (last visited Feb. 10, 2003).
51.
See http://mail-abuse.org/ (last visited Feb. 10, 2003).
52. See http://mail-abuse.org/rbl/ (last visited Mar. 31, 2003).
53. Sabra-Anne Kelin, State Regulation of Unsolicited Commercial E-Mail, 16
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 435, 442-43 (2001).

54. PC World.com has reported a recently filed case in this regard. Mark Turner,
president of e-mail advertising firm Opt-In Marketing Services has filed suit against his ISP and
three anti-spam organizations, claiming that the anti-spain groups are 'sinister entities' who have
conspired to put him out of business by faking complaints about his activities. He also claimed
that such organizations have, in the past, accepted donations from AOL and MSN in return for
turning a blind eye to those large ISPs' efforts to send their own unsolicited commercial e-mail.
Daniel Tynan, Spammers Claim Rights, Too: Opt-In Marketing Services ChallengesAnti-Spam
Efforts,
Organizations
in
Court,
PCWORLD.COM,
10 16 10 0 0
http://www.pcworld.com/news/article/0,aid,
, .asp.

June

3,

2002,

at
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55

public involvement.
Gahtan et al. provide a practical list of actions that private
individuals may have recourse to in order to prevent spain and to
assist those who do receive junk mail. 56 Actions such as ensuring that
their ISP is not using background programs that enable Web servers
to harvest e-mail addresses, not disclosing their address in public
areas, using spam filtering software, and forwarding spam to the ISP
of both recipient and sender are all useful and pragmatic approaches.57
However, they do little in the way of stemming the spam tide or,
indeed, discouraging the junk mail from being sent in the first
instance. Attempts to discourage the sending of spain by stigmatizing
it have only been successful to a certain degree. As Sorkin notes,
such attempts have only served to make bulk mailing a fringe
activity-this is undoubtedly a major reason for the dubious moral
quality of many of the goods and services advertised through spainand social pressures tend to be largely ineffectual against such
groups.58
Attempts by ISPs to self-regulate their industry have been
equally hampered. The simplest method with which an ISP can
regulate spam is through an appropriate clause in its contractual use
policy. Most ISP license agreements contain a clause banning the
sending of bulk mail outright through its network. There are several
reasons why such licenses are largely ineffective against spammers
but the main problem is that of enforceability. According to Hoffman
& Crocker, these legally binding agreements lack enforceability due
to the difficulty in reliably identifying the originators of junk mail. 59
Another factor has been the difficulty in proving a precise level of
damage but, as will be examined later, this issue has not deterred ISPs
from initiating litigation. Another legal stumbling block for ISPs in
this regard has manifested itself in relation to the blocking of
incoming spam. Although measures taken to block the sending of
spam have the force of contract law, in the case of incoming spam the
sender has no contract with the recipient's ISP. This leaves the
receiving ISP powerless to deal with junk mail until after it has been
55.

See, e.g., Kelin, supra note 53, at 441-43; Sorkin, supranote 14.

56.
ALAN M. GAHTAN, MARTIN P. J. KRATZ, & J. FRASER MANN, INTERNET LAW: A
PRACTICAL GUIDE FOR LEGAL & BUSINESS PROFESSIONALS 178-80 (1998).

57.
58.
59.

Id.
Sorkin, supranote 14, at 341-44.
Paul Hoffman & Dave Crocker, Internet Mail Consortium Report: UBE-SOL IMCR008, Unsolicited Bulk Email: Mechanisms for Control, May 4, 1998, §6,
http://www.imc.org/ube-sol.html.
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sent. At this point, the ISP can act by dealing with the spam in either
of two ways. Filtering software can be used to automatically delete
any detected bulk mail, but this may lead to the elimination of
genuine bulk or commercial mail. Secondly, bulk mail may be
diverted to a special "bulk mail folder" 60 from where the recipient can
choose whether to read or delete it. However, many critics argue that
by this stage the damage has already been done. 6' Even if ISP
contractual use policies were potent legal instruments, other problems
emerge. For instance, Sabra-Anne Kelin notes that different ISPs
have different use policies, which may in fact conflict, and that the
resulting conflict of obligations could raise compliance problems not
only for spammers, but also for other legitimate e-mail user groups. 62
Problems, such as described above, have led ISPs (in the United
States in particular) to investigate the possibility of forming trade
associations to standardize business practices on the Internet which,
through private contracts, could implement and enforce an industrywide policy against junk e-mailing.63 However, as Fisher points out,
such a move, due to its collaborative nature could easily be used to
suppress competition and would likely run afoul of federal antitrust
laws, in particular section 1 of the Sherman Act. 64 Antitrust
legislation in the United States is particularly stringent, as in the
decision of the Supreme Court in Fashion Originators' Guild of
America, Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission.65 In reinforcing this
point, the court found that an industry group boycott could not be
justified on the basis of deterring tortious conduct.66 On the other
side of the fence, the International Federation of Direct Marketing
Agencies (FEDMA) 67 launched an e-mail preference service initiative
in 1998 in an attempt to curb the growing clamor surrounding the
practice of unsolicited commercial and bulk e-mailing, a practice that
FEDMA believed to be a highly useful marketing tool if used
responsibly.
Basically, the e-mail preference service, the U.K.

60.

In the UK, this service was pioneered by Yahoo! UK in December 1999 and is

offered by most major e-mail providers in some shape or form today.
Sorkin, supra note 14, at 345-46.
62.
Kelin, supra note 53, at 441-42.
63.
David A. Gottardo, Commercialism and the Downfall of Internet Self Governance:
An Application ofAntitrust Law, 16 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 125, 141-42 (1997).
61.

64.

Fisher, supra note 28, at 396 (citing the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1).

65.

Fashion Originators' Guild of Am., Inc. v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 312 U.S. 457 (1941).

66. Id.
67. See Preferences Services in Europe, FEDMA Web site, at
http://www.fedma.org/code/page.cfm?id_page=77# (last visited Mar. 31, 2003).
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version of which was launched in January 2000 by the UK Direct
Marketing Association, 68 is a large spain opt-out register maintained
by the DMA and supposedly consulted regularly by advertisers who
are members of the DMA. In its first years of use in the U.K., the
register has proved a resounding failure. It is highly unlikely that the
register is consulted by more than a handful of spammers-certainly
not by those to whom it was intended to apply-and consequently, its
usefulness in the future is very much in doubt.
For all the reasons mentioned above, the various forms of
vigilante, self-help, and industry regulation applied to the problem of
unsolicited e-mail advertising have been of limited practical use.
These shortcomings and the growth of the spain problem to epidemic
proportions lead to the need for urgent government control. Other
private actors have taken their own action in the form of litigation and
the resulting body of emerging substantive law will be examined in
the next two parts.
III. UNSOLICITED COMMERCIAL E-MAIL LAW IN THE U.S.

A.

The Emergence of Substantive Law

As previously mentioned, the U.S. approach toward the law
governing unsolicited commercial e-mail is important for a European
perspective on this issue for a number of reasons. First, the majority
of bulk e-mail advertisement received by European e-mail users
originate in the U.S. and are intended for a U.S. audience. Such emails are of no relevance to European consumers and can thus be
easily classified as junk e-mail. Although European e-mail users
therefore remain passive actors in this regard, those who find
themselves in receipt of burdensome quantities of U.S. junk mail may
have more than a passing interest in what is being done in that
jurisdiction to combat the problem. The issue of international
jurisdiction and the future possibility of a global harmonization of ecommerce law will be discussed in Part V. Second, as the U.S. was
the first country to encounter a major problem with spain and was
also the first jurisdiction to attempt to deal with the problem on a
legal basis, the law there today is in a more evolved state than
anywhere else in the world. Lessons may thus be learned from the
U.S. experience, the approach taken and the mistakes made. A third

68. Advert. Info. Group, Notice No. 75, UK: DMA Launches E-Mail Preference, Jan. 18,
2000 at 4-5.
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pertinent reason to examine the U.S. legal framework is due to the
jurisprudential similarities between that country and the UK. As a
common law country, decisions of U.S. court, though not of binding
authority in the UK and Ireland, will be of persuasive authority and so
parallels may be drawn between common law actions taken against
spammers there and possible future actions in this jurisdiction. With
respect to European Union legislative measures, certain parallels may
also be drawn between the federal-state dichotomy in the U.S. and the
increasingly conspicuous federalist nature of EU law. This is
particularly evident when it comes to laws relating to the emerging
digital technologies and the information society, a field in which the
EU clearly aspires to become a world leader. A further point of
reference between the two legal backdrops is the starting point for the
development of a law against spain, that of analogy with the law in
relation to commercial telephone and fax solicitations.
The history of U.S. law on junk mail, telephone and fax
advertising is an involved and complicated one 69 which the author
will not burden the reader with in these pages, but a brief synopsis is
of benefit. In Rowan v. United States Post Office Department,70 the
Supreme Court was invited to consider the constitutionality of
legislation 7 that provided consumers with a means for removing their
names and addresses from the postal mailing lists of marketers who
were publicizing erotic or sexually provocative material. In rejecting
the argument that the statute violated the plaintiffs right to
communicate and in upholding the statute, the Court found that
"nothing in the Constitution compels [people] to listen to or view any
unwanted communication, whatever its merit., 72 The crucial aspect
of Title III of the Postal Revenue and Federal Salary Act of 1967 was
that it vested power in the private homeowner, rather than the
government, to regulate what mail he did or did not receive:
Congress provided this sweeping power not only to protect privacy
but to avoid possible constitutional questions that might arise from
vesting the power to make any discretionary evaluation of the

69. For good, in-depth articles on the subject see Jonathan Byrne, Squeezing Span offthe
Net: FederalRegulation of Unsolicited CommercialE-mail, 2 W. VA. J. L. & TECH. 1.4 (1998),
at http://www.wvu.edu/-wvjolt/Arch/Byme/Byme.htm; Michael W. Carroll, Garbage In:
Emerging Media and Regulation of Unsolicited Commercial Solicitations, II BERKELEY TECH.

L. J. 233 (1996).
70. Rowan v. United States Post Office Department, 397 U.S. 728 (1970).
71.
Title III of the Postal Revenue and Federal Salary Act of 1967, 39 U.S.C. § 4009
(1964 ed., Supp. IV) (current version at 39 U.S.C. § 3010 (2000)).
72. Rowan, 397 U.S. at 737.
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73
material in a government official.

Commercial telephone and fax solicitations may be regarded as
even more analogous to e-mail spamming. Such activities were
legislated against by the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991
(TCPA).7 4 The TCPA prohibits the use of auto-dialers to play prerecorded messages to homes and businesses and also forbids the
sending of unsolicited commercial solicitations from computers or fax
machines to telephones or fax machines. The Act encountered almost
immediate constitutional challenge in Destination Ventures v. Federal
Communications Commission,75 where it was upheld both at first
instance and on appeal. Both courts found that Congress had a
substantial interest in a very real problem; unsolicited faxes were an
invasion of privacy, a waste of valuable business time and
opportunity and, above all, represented an unacceptable shifting of the
costs (in terms of ink and toner) to the recipient7 6 Moorefield
comments that the decision in Destination Ventures not only simply
validated the TCPA but also went further, paving the way for the
expansive interpretation of the Act to include unsolicited commercial
e-mail.77 An analogous argument was put forward by the plaintiff in
the case of Snow v. Doherty78 but, as Jan Samoriski 79 points out, a
detailed reading of the TCPA leaves little doubt that the legislature
intended the Act to apply solely to transmissions by fax. There are
good reasons for not extending the reach of the TCPA to cover spain
(due to the inherent nature of e-mail technology) and such will be
touched upon in the discussion on U.S. legislative measures.
Therefore, by the mid-1990's as spain became an increasingly
problematic phenomenon, there was a void of legislation on the issue.
Although there was some political discussion on the subject, 80 ISPs

73.

Id. at 743.

74.

47 U.S.C. § 227 (1994).

75.

Destination Ventures v. Fed. Communications Comm'n, 844 F. Supp. 632 (D. Or.

1994), aff'd, 46 F.3d 54 (9th Cir. 1995).
76.

Moorefield, supra note 45.

77.
78.

Id.
Snow v. Doherty, No. 3:97-CV---0635 (RM) (N.D. Ind. 1997), available at

http://mama.indstate.edu/users/dougie/lawsuit.html.
79.
See Jan H. Samoriski, Unsolicited Commercial E-mail, the Internet and the First
Amendment: Another Free Speech Showdown in Cyberspace?, 43 J. BROAD. & ELEC. MEDIA
670(1999).
80.
See, e.g., three federal bills proposed in 1997: Netizens Protection Act, H.R. 1748,
105th Cong. (proposed by Rep. Christopher Smith); Electronic Mailbox Protection Act, S. 875,
105th Cong. (Sen. Robert Torricelli); Unsolicited Commercial Electronic Mail Choice Act, S.
771, 105th Cong. (Sen. Frank Murkowski).
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who were losing irate customers, business reputation, and countless
dollars due to spamming decided to act first and instigate litigation
against known spammers.
An early such case, and one which establishes important precedent is
that of CompuServe v. Cyber Promotions.8 1 The facts of this case
were that the plaintiff, one of the largest ISPs in the U.S., ordered the
defendant to cease using its network for the purpose of mass
electronic mailings after the plaintiff CompuServe had received a
flood of complaints from subscribers about the unacceptable volume
of spam they were receiving. 82 Despite the plaintiffs request, and the
fact that CompuServe expressly prohibited spamming through its
acceptable use policy, the volume of spam being disseminated by
Cyber Promotions increased. The plaintiff responded by introducing
spam-filtering software that could automatically detect and delete
mass mailings from the defendant. However, Cyber Promotions then
began to falsify the sender information in the headers of its messages
and to configure its server to falsify its domain name and IP address.
Such manipulative behavior enabled the defendant to continue with
its spamming activities and CompuServe felt it had no choice but to
litigate, doing so on the basis of the common law theory of trespass to
personal property (or chattels). Judge Graham in his judgment notes
that "a trespass to chattel may be committed by intentionally using or
83
intermeddling with the chattel in possession of another."
"Intermeddling" is defined as "intentionally bringing about a physical
contact with the chattel. 8 4
The judge goes on to cite authority for the assertion that
electronic signals generated and sent by computer are sufficiently
physically tangible to support a trespass cause of action,8 5 and held
that the defendant's contact with the plaintiffs computers was clearly
intentional. Regarding the issue of damage (the tort of trespass to
chattel in U.S. law requires some actual damage as a prima facie
element, whereas damage is assumed where there is a trespass to real
property), Judge Graham found that the diminished value of
CompuServe's computer equipment, due to the defendant's
"multitudinous electronic mailings" and the consequent draining of

81.

CompuServe v. Cyber Promotions, 962 F. Supp. 1015 (S.D. Ohio 1997).

82.

Id. at 1017.

83.

Id. at 1021 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 217(b) (1965)).

84.

Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 217 cmt. e (1965)).

85.
Id. (citing Thrifty-Tel, Inc. v. Bezeneck, 46 Cal. App. 4th 1559, 1567 (1996); State v.
McGraw, 480 N.E. 2d 552, 554 (Ind. 1985); State v. Riley, 846 P.2d 1365 (1993)).
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disk space and processing power was sufficient damage to uphold the
course of action.86 Further, the fact that CompuServe's full resources
were unavailable to serve its subscribers, and the fact that many
terminated their accounts, also meant that Cyber Promotion's
intrusions were actionable as they harmed the plaintiffs goodwill and
business reputation.87 Judge Graham paid little credence to the
defendant's claim to freedom of speech and ordered a preliminary
injunction enjoining the defendant from sending any unsolicited email to CompuServe subscribers.8 8
The CompuServe decision is an interesting one and, at first
glance, appears to be a potent legal weapon against spammers,
particularly as it was followed in America Online v. IMS89 by a
District Court in Virginia. But there are a couple of good reasons
why the trespass to chattel cause of action may be of more limited
application. First, one can gather from the facts of the case that this
was an instance of what may be termed "aggravated spamming" i.e.
the defendant was repeatedly ordered to cease and desist and yet
continued with his course of action and even used evasive techniques
in his efforts to continue. Although the CompuServe trespass doctrine
may be readily applied to bulk mailers who have actual notice that
they are trespassing, such a cause of action would be useless against a
one time spammer or an individual using different accounts or
network providers for each unsolicited advertisement sent. The
second issue is one of enforcement. Back in 1997 it may have been
relatively easy to track down a spammer, but the technical proficiency
of today's mass e-mailers means that they are harder to locate. They
are also often one-man operations unlike Cyber Promotions9" which
was, in fact, an identifiable and fully incorporated company. For
these reasons, ISPs and other injured parties have had to seek out
other legal doctrines on which to base their claims against spammers.
B. LitigatingAgainst Spammers: Causes ofAction
As Dianne Latham rightly points out, "[t]he list of potential
offenses spammers commit is extensive .......[t]racking down
spammers in cyberspace is more difficult than finding legal theories

86.

CompuServe, 962 F. Supp. at 1022.

87.

Id.

88.

Id.

89.

Am. Online, Inc. v. IMS, 24 F. Supp. 2d 548 (E. D. Va. 1998).

90.

See CompuServe, 962 F. Supp. 1015.
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under which to charge them." 9' The practice of using false return
addresses in e-mail headers and the increasing use of forgery by
spammers where mass mailers forge the name of a well-respected
company into the subject line or body of their advertisement both to
evade filters and to increase the legitimacy of the e-mail greatly
increases the number of potential causes of action against them.
Consequently, different legal approaches are adapted to best suit the
facts of any given case. While examining the various legal theories it
is worth keeping in mind the aforementioned quote by Latham and
the fact that, in very many cases, simply tracking down and
identifying the spammer may prove the most difficult obstacle in
spam litigation.
The two cases mentioned in the previous subsection, those of
CompuServe v. Cyber Promotions and AOL v. IMS, both involved a
large ISP suing a spammer for trespass to chattel. However, the first
spam related suit was a small claims case taken by an individual email subscriber, Robert Arkow, against CompuServe in 1995.92 The
claim, based on the expansive interpretation of the Telephone
Consumer Protection Act of 1991 and which was settled out of court
for undisclosed terms,93 raises the issue of the right of individual
subscribers to sue spammers directly. Fisher proposes that a trespass
cause of action could be available to private e-mail users, who have a
proprietary interest in their e-mail account.94 However, issues such as
the difficulty of proving actual harm, 95 to show accumulation of any
injury, and the prohibitive costs involved in going to court may limit
the effectiveness of this remedy. Class actions are pointed out as a
possible solution to these problems.96 However, other, particularly
evidentiary, problems emerge and in the absence of specifically
tailored legislation, such an action would likely fail.
Other than a trespass claim, the next, most common action
against spammers is trademark infringement and false designation of
origin. False designation of origin is a violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1125

91.
Dianne Plunkett Latham, Electronic Commerce in the 21' Century: Article, Spam
Remedies, 27 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1649, 1651 (2001).
92. David E. Sorkin, Unsolicited Commercial E-Mail and the Telephone Consumer
Protection Act of1991, 45 BUFF. L. REV. 1001, n.12 (1997).
93. Id.
94. Fisher, supra note 28, at 387.
95. Anne E. Hawley, Comment, Taking Spam Out of Your Cyberspace Diet: Common
Law Applied to Bulk Unsolicited Advertising Via Electronic Mail, 66 UMKC L. REV. 381, 403
(1997).
96. Fisher, supra note 28, at 388.
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(a)(1) of the Lanham Act. In America Online v. IMS, 97 the defendant
was caught by this subsection as he falsely designated the origin of
his e-mail as coming from AOL and in doing so had deceived
recipients and had caused damage. The Court applied a threepronged test: (1) The alleged violator must employ a false
designation; (2) the false designation must deceive as to origin,
ownership or sponsorship; and (3) the plaintiff must believe that he or
98
she is or is likely to be damaged by such an act.
In a similar case involving the same plaintiff and almost identical
facts, America Online v. LCGM, the court applied a slightly different
test with the same effect.99 A false designation of origin claim is
supported if:
(1) a defendant uses a designation; (2) in interstate commerce; (3)
in connection with goods and services; (4) which designation is
likely to cause confusion, mistake or deception as to origin,
sponsorship, or approval of defendant's goods or services; and (5)
plaintiff has been or is likely to be damaged by these acts. 100
Also falling within the ambit of the Lanham Act is trademark
dilution.10 ' Raised successfully in IMS and LCGM, dilution entails the
reduction of the distinctive quality of a famous or well-known service
mark. The dilution claims in the AOL decisions were based on the
doctrine of "tarnishment," which requires evidence to the effect that
the famous mark will be diminished through the negative association
with the defendant's use. The AOL decisions seem to highlight the
effectiveness of the trademark infringement approach in cases where
the sender of spam has forged e-mail headers. Dilution claims are
further strengthened by the fact that as Khong notes, 10 2 the U.S. courts
have taken a dim view of the practice of spamming and that a
negative association will be assumed for the purposes of a dilution
claim under the tamishment heading.
As was mentioned before, a breach of contract case may also be
taken by an ISP against a spammer with whom contractual relations
exist. A good example of such a case is Hotmail Corp. v. Van$
Money Pie Inc. There, the Northern District Court of California
found the defendant to have breached the Hotmail subscriber service

97.
98.
99.

100.
101.
102.

See Am. Online, Inc. v. IMS, 24 F. Supp. 2d 548 (E. D. Va. 1998).
Id. at 551 (citing Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)).
Am. Online, Inc. v. LCGM, Inc., 46 F. Supp. 2d 444 (E.D. Va. 1998).

Id. at 449 (citation omitted).
Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 125(c)(1) (2000).
Khong, supra note 7.
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agreement by sending spain from a falsely designated Hotmail
address and using a separate Hotmail account to return invalidly
addressed messages which were never read.' 0 3 The Hotmail case was
a relatively straightforward application of the law of contract as the
Hotmail service agreement specifically prohibited the sending of
unsolicited bulk e-mail and made a provision for the termination of
accounts whose users had violated the terms of service.' 0 4 Such cases
become more difficult where the service contract makes no specific
reference to unsolicited bulk e-mail but provides for punitive action
where a "breach of netiquette" or some other equally broad term
occurs.

This very point was addressed, however by a Canadian Court, in
the case of 1267623 Ontario Inc. v. Nexx Online Inc.10 5 Here, Nexx
Online hosted the plaintiffs Web site from which the plaintiff sent
unsolicited promotional e-mails to many Internet users who, in turn,
complained to the defendant. The defendant responded by informing
the plaintiff that such activity was in breach of its hosting agreement,
which contained a term obliging signatories to follow generally
accepted "netiquette" when sending e-mails or posting to newsgroups.
This warning was not heeded however and the plaintiff then engaged
a third party to send more spam promoting its business. This led the
defendant to deactivate Ontario's Web site and reactivate the
plaintiffs application for an interlocutory injunction. The Ontario
Superior Court of Justice, in rejecting the plaintiffs application, held
that the defendant was permitted to discontinue the hosting of the
Web site as the plaintiffs conduct constituted a breach of the parties'
contract.10 6 In so holding, the court recognized that the practice of
sending unsolicited bulk e-mail was contrary to the emerging
principles of "netiquette." Furthermore, the court found that the
plaintiff had breached another provision of the contract which
permitted the defendant to add additional terms upon notice to the
plaintiff. Examining the conduct of the parties, the court found that
the defendant's warning to the plaintiff to cease its spamming
activities constituted notice of the defendant's wish to add just such
an additional term. 0 7 The case represents not only the power of
private contract law to help ISPs combat the spain problem in cases

103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

Hotmail Corp. v. Van$ Money Pie Inc., 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1020 (N.D. Cal. 1998).
Id. at 1025.
1267623 Ontario, Inc. v. Nexx Online, Inc., 45 O.R.3d 40 (Ont. Sup. Ct. 1999).
Id. at 50.
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where the spammer can be identified, but also is important in light of
the court's recognition of the legally binding status of self-regulatory
online norms such as netiquette.
Although most ISP service
agreements today contain specific provisions relating to spam, the
decision of the Canadian Courts to recognize netiquette may have
broader implications relating to the law in other areas of e-commerce,
particularly if other jurisdictions choose to follow it.
The Ontario decision, as well as most of the aforementioned
cases, represents instances where the injured party has sought
equitable relief (usually in the form of an interlocutory or preliminary
injunction) as opposed to monetary relief. Although the successful
party in an application for injunctive relief will often be successful in
obtaining an order for costs, significant damages are seldom awarded
due to the difficulty in quantifying the precise loss to an ISP due to
spamming.
Another hurdle in the way of pecuniary recompense for ISPs has
been the issue of agency. The issue of agency arises when an
advertiser, as in the Ontario case, engages an independent contractor
to mount a spain campaign on his behalf. In such an instance, if the
affected ISP wishes to, it could relatively easily obtain an injunction
through a trespass, trademark or contract action against the advertiser;
if he wishes to obtain damages, the preferred option would be to sue
the advertiser directly, as the party would be more likely than an
independent contractor to have sufficient capital to be able to afford
such a payment. However, for this to succeed a plaintiff must be able
to show that the damage caused by the spammer was carried out in
the course of employment or under conditions whereby the
spammer's actions were subject to the customer company's control,
and thus the advertiser becomes vicariously liable. The hub of the
issue boils down to the instructions that the advertiser gives to the
'agent,' whether the harm is done by some devilment dreamt up and
carried out solely by the contractor, without the knowledge of the
advertiser. 10 8 Ontario v. Nexx Online is a good example of the
former, as the company in that case engaged a third party for the
purposes of carrying out spamming activities of which it had notice
were in breach of the service contract.
America Online, Inc. v. National Health Care Discount, Inc.
(NHCD)'0 9 was a case brought by AOL for summary judgment
108.

See Joseph D'Ambrosio, Should Junk E-Mail be Legally Protected?, 17 SANTA
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109.

Am. Online, Inc. v. Nat'l Health Care Discount, Inc. (NHCD), 121 F. Supp. 2d 1255
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against NHCD, relating to over 76 million unsolicited e-mails sent by
the defendant. The District Court Judge ruled that the question of
whether the contract e-mailers engaged by NHCD to carry out the
campaign were acting as agents was a genuine issue of material fact
that precluded the granting of a summary judgment and one which
must go to full trial for resolution. ° A prior case which had gone to
full trial on the agency issue was Seidl v. Greentree Mortgage Co.
The defendant in this case hired a single contractor on a one-time, flat
fee basis to conduct an e-mail marketing campaign on its behalf.
Greentree provided the body of the advertisement but left the time,
manner, and choice of recipients up to the contractor, Mark Van
Keuren, who used his own equipment for the job.' 11 Van Keuren
falsified the "from:" and "reply to:" information in his e-mail headers,
electing to use the address "nobody@localhost.com." Unfortunately,
the domain name localhost.com had been registered, apparently as a
gag, by the plaintiff computer science student who received over
7,000 of the undeliverable advertisements as well as numerous
complaints, causing his computer to crash. The plaintiffs claim
failed as Greentree was able to show that Van Keuren was an
independent contractor whose forgery Greentree had no knowledge
of. The court also frowned on Seidl's reason for bringing the suit.
The student was an anti-spam activist who wished to publicize the
adverse consequences to companies who get involved with
spamming. Such efforts at changing the law, the court reasoned,
would be more effectively addressed in the legislative arena. Seidl's
12
pro-activism on the socio-political issue of spamming, as Latham'
hinted at, had done his chances at winning few favors.
. The decisions in NHCD and Seidl appear to offer companies a
form of legal insulation from the consequences of spamming by
merely engaging an independent contractor to do the job for them. As
D'Ambrosio points out,"' this leaves ISPs with the unhappy
predicament of deciding whether it is strategically viable to go after
the advertising companies themselves or whether simply to attempt to
stop the contract e-mailers from sending the spain. However, it is not
yet clear whether the judiciary in other jurisdictions will follow the
reasoning of the District Courts in Iowa and Colorado. In this regard

(N.D. Iowa 2000).
110.

Id.at 1279-80.
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it is certainly worth pointing out that due to the summary nature of the
judgment in NHCD and the court's disapproval of the plaintiffs
ulterior motives in Seidl, a future court may well distinguish such
cases and re-examine the agency issue.
The preceding case law has demonstrated the fact that litigation,
particularly for ISPs and relay operators, 14 has proved to be a
powerful tool in the fight against spain. As well as actions for
trespass to chattels, trademark infringement, breach of contract, other
116
15
lesser used causes of action include nuisance,' unfair competition,
8 negligence, 9 defamation, 20
deceptive trade,117 unjust enrichment,
12
'
fraud, and misrepresentation.
In bringing suits against spammers, ISPs often use many
different causes of action simultaneously. For example, in Typhoon v.
Kentech Enterprises, the plaintiff ISP sued the defendant spammer
claiming misappropriation of name and identity, trespass to chattels,
unjust enrichment, and unfair competition, as well as violations 122
of
both the Lanham and Electronic Communication Privacy Acts.
Despite this success, members of the judiciary123 as well as
academics 124 have expressed their displeasure with the use of
common law remedies to control the problem of spam. Their
argument is to the effect that span is such a unique and novel
problem that it can only be effectively addressed through specifically
tailored legislation. Such legislation, Kelin adds, would also manifest
transparency and public accountability as well as, perhaps, giving rise

114. Relay operators have been successful in suing spammers under many of the same
legal headings as ISPs have. In particular, trespass has proved to be successful. See also Sorkin,
supranote 14, at 362-63.
115.
Report and Recommendation, America Online, Inc. v. Christian Bros., No. 98 Civ.
8959 (DAB) (HBP) (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
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(proposing federal legislation as most promising means to address problems with unsolicited email). '
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to a right of recourse for individual e-mail users effected by spain.
Furthermore, the sheer expense of litigation, together with the
uncertain status of the law in relation to junk e-mail and the pressure
applied by various anti-spain lobbying groups, has led to the
enactment of legislation.

C. U.S. Legislative Efforts Against Spam and Two
ConstitutionalBarriers
Spain legislation in the U.S. has proven to be reasonably
successful at the state level, but efforts to enact nationwide federal
laws have proven to be abortive. Nevada became the first state to
pass a statute regulating unsolicited commercial e-mail in 1997,126
with California, Washington and Virginia following closely behind.
The laws of these four states then became models for other state
legislatures around the country and, at the time of writing, twenty-six
states had passed laws regulating junk e-mail to a greater or lesser
degree.127 These state laws vary considerably in their approach to
tackling the spam problem, but the most commonly targeted practices
in the statutes are those which involve the concealment of the
sender's identity. In many states, it is now unlawful to falsify the
point of origin and transmission path of unsolicited e-mail
advertisements. Washington state law, considered one of the most
stringent, expressly forbids the use of a third party's domain name
without consent; although, it may be argued that other states
implicitly forbid this by making reference generally to "routing
information."'' 28 In Washington, as well as Illinois, the use of
misleading information in the subject line (spammers often use
deceptive subject titles such as "Re: Your E-mail" in order to
encourage users to open them) is prohibited, while Nevada law
requires that e-mail advertisements should contain the true name,
geographical location, and e-mail address of the sender.
Affirmative labeling requirements have proven to be popular in
other states. In Tennessee, the character string 'ADV:' must begin
the subject line of all commercial email solicitations, with the
exception of advertisements promoting goods or services of a

125.

Kelin, supra note 53, at 443.

126.

Alan Cohen, Can the Spain: Bills Declare War on Junk E-Mail, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 15,

1997, at S2.
127.
A list of the states is maintained at http://www.spamlaws.com/state/index.html (last
visited Feb. 9, 2003).
128.

Fisher, supra note 28, at 401-02.
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sexually explicit nature where the string 'ADV: ADLT' must be used.
One problem with this type of regulation, particularly at the state
level, is that for it to function effectively, the same law would need to
be in force in every other jurisdiction from which an e-mail user is
likely to receive spam. For instance, if the federal Unsolicited
Commercial Electronic Mail Choice Act of 1997129 had ever come
into force, e-mail advertisements would have had to carry the label
'advertisement' in the subject line, leaving e-marketers in Tennessee
with
conflicting
obligations
and
tautologically
labeled
advertisements.1 30 Several jurisdictions, including Louisiana and
California, have given legal force to ISPs' network policies by
banning the sending of spain in violation of the policy set by an ISP.
In the Californian law, the spammer must have actual notice of the
network provider's policy, while the Louisiana law is silent on the
issue of notice. Some state laws include the mandatory provision of
opt-out procedures for every unsolicited e-mail, while Delaware law
goes further, requiring the pre-existence of a business relationship
before the sending of any commercial e-mail, which seems more
along the lines of an opt-in mechanism. As regards remedies for
violations of the various state laws, statutory damages range from $10
per message received by individuals in Nevada, up to $500 in
Washington, with daily caps ranging from $5,000 in Tennessee,
through $25,000 in Oklahoma, to infinite liability in Washington.
The abundance of state legislation dealing with spain is due, in
part, to the absence of federal legislation in this area. The lack of
federal law is by no means an indication of political ignorance of the
problem-to date at least fourteen federal bills have been proposed
and have died either in Congress or the Senate. 3 ' The proposed laws
have ranged from amendments to the 1991 Telephone Consumer
Protection Act to include e-mail solicitations (effectively, an outright
ban on spam), labeling, point of origin, and content-based restrictions
such as those adopted at state level.
Samoriski identifies the
probable-and mainly political-reasons behind the failure of so
many federal bills:
... the likelihood of any legislation that might upset the powerful
129.

Unsolicited Commercial Electronic Mail Choice Act, S. 771, 105th Cong.

130.
This problem has been compounded at the state level by the recent introduction of a
Pennsylvania law that requires the string "ADV- ADULT" to be used at the start of the subject

line of a message promoting sexually explicit products or services. Fisher, supra note 28, at
402-03.
131.
For an up-to-date list, see http://www.cauce.org/legislation/index.shtml (last visited
Feb. 11, 2003).
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commercial media interests that are driving the development of the
Internet is doubtful. Congress, sensitive to the media it must rely
on to get re-elected, has attempted to straddle the fence between
what the industry wants and what users would prefer. The result
has been the appearance of legislation that may be
unconstitutional, does too little, favors industry interests and/or is
directed at legitimizing [unsolicited commercial
e-mail] for
132
marketing by putting 'spammers' out of business.
If a federal law on spain does eventually receive the President's
signature, the legislature will have to give careful consideration to
what approach is taken, due to the constitutional barriers that have
arisen to any statutory solutions to the spam problem.
1. First Amendment Issues
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution states,
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion,
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press."' 133 Advertisers, pomographers and slanderers
have all attempted to invoke the First Amendment to defend their
actions and a large body of jurisprudence has developed accordingly.
Significant for the purposes of a junk e-mail perspective is the degree
of Constitutional protection offered for commercial speech in the
landmark decision in CentralHudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public
Service Commission of New York, 134 where the Supreme Court
annunciated a four-part test to determine the constitutionality of
statutes:
At the outset, we must determine whether the expression is
protected by the First Amendment. For commercial speech to come
within that provision, it at least must concern lawful activity and
not be misleading. Next, we ask whether the asserted government
interest is substantial. If both inquiries yield positive answers, we
must determine whether the regulation directly advances the
governmental interest asserted, and whether135it is not more
extensive than is necessary to serve that interest.
In determining whether a statute is "not more extensive than is
necessary," the court in Board of Trustees of State University of New

132.
133.
134.

Samoriski, supranote 79, at 685.
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of New York, 447 U.S. 557

(1980).
135.

Id.at 566.
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held that the regulation did not have to be the least
restrictive means available, but that the First Amendment merely
requires a reasonable fit between the goal and the means, i.e., that
there be a measure of proportionality. However, in City of Cincinnati
v. Discovery Network, Inc. it was found that existence of other less
restrictive alternatives would be a factor in 37determining whether the
"fit" between ends and means is reasonable. 1
York V.

The earliest litigant to raise the First Amendment protections in
the course of spam proceedings was the plaintiff in Cyber
Promotions,Inc. v. America Online, Inc.' 38 There, the highly litigious
Cyber Promotions filed an action against AOL claiming that AOL's
obstruction and filtering of the plaintiffs spain was in violation of its
right to free speech. In rejecting this contention, the U.S. District
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania held that an ISP is
neither a state actor nor a manifestation of the state and thus, its
actions are not subject to First Amendment review. 139 An important
factor in this regard is that an ISP does not exercise any municipal
powers that are traditionally the prerogative of the state. This finding
was upheld by the court in CompuServe v. Cyber Promotions, a case
discussed in detail above, where Cyber again raised 40the First
Amendment argument, this time in defense of its activities.
Legislation and First Amendment scrutiny thereof is a different
matter. To pass constitutional muster, a statute that restricts legal and
non-misleading commercial speech must, under Central Hudson,
directly advance a substantial governmental interest and do so with
proportionality. The first thing to note is that laws which restrict the
sending of misleading or illegal spam will not undergo First
Amendment scrutiny. This would, in theory, apply to laws curtailing
e-mail advertisements promoting the sale of, for example, explosives
or narcotics, as well as to laws which prohibit the falsification of email headers and routing information, although there has been some
debate on this latter point."4 Displaying a substantial government
interest seems relatively straightforward, 14 2 given the size of the spam
problem today, its disruptive nature, and its high cost to business. As
136.

Bd. of Trs. of State Univ. of New York v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469 (1989).

137. City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410 (1993).
138. Cyber Promotions, Inc. v. Am. Online, Inc., 948 F. Supp. 436 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
139. Id. at441-44.
140. CompuServe, 962 F. Supp. at 1025-26.
141. See, e.g., Samoriski, supra note 79, at 679-82 (contending that any law which goes
further than requiring subject line labelling will run into First Amendment problems).
142. See generally,Carroll, supra note 69, at 272-74, 277-78.
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Fisher puts it, "[t]he governmental interest in preserving the viability
of e-mail as a medium of communication is likely to be considered
substantial if there is a real danger that this medium will be rendered
useless without regulation."'' 43
Similarly, under the direct
advancement heading no serious legal obstacles are raised. Any of
the legal approaches outlined above, be they labeling, content
restrictions, opt-out schemes, or forgery prohibitions, would directly
advance the governmental interests involved, leaving only the issue of
proportionality.
Labeling requirements, as they would protect
spammers' rights to deliver mail to willing consumers without
imposing any real costs or burdens, are universally accepted as being
sufficiently narrowly tailored to advance the governmental interest
without being more extensive than is necessary. The same might be
said of opt-out registers, as an advertiser has no right to solicit
consumers whom he knows are not interested, and requirements not
to falsify source and routing information, given that such falsification
requires greater effort than the truth. The availability of such
attractive alternatives may prevent a court from upholding a statutory
ban on junk e-mail. Given the large-scale cost-shifting involved in
spain and its few redeeming features, a wholesale prohibition does not
seem overly authoritative but, in any First Amendment inquiry, a
court may view the existence of less restrictive alternatives as being a
decisive factor and strike down the statute. It remains to be seen
whether such a constitutional analysis takes place at the state level (an
examination of the restrictive state laws of Washington and Delaware
would prove interesting) or if any future federal laws come into force.
2.

The U.S. Constitution Dormant Commerce Clause
144
The U.S. Supreme Court, in General Motors Corp. v. Tracy,
has held that the Commerce Clause 145 of the U.S. Constitution
contains a negative implication, the dormant Commerce Clause,
which prohibits the state regulation of interstate commerce. Although
the law is not absolute, states cannot interfere with the power of the
federal government to regulate interstate commerce by passing their
own laws. The clause has, over time, been subject to various
interpretations but the modem form prohibits state legislatures from
discriminating against or unduly burdening interstate commerce. In

143.
Fisher, supra note 28, at 409.
144. Gen. Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278, 287 (1997).
145.
The Commerce Clause states that Congress shall have Power ... to regulate
Commerce ...among the several States. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.
3.
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American LibrariesAssociation v. Pataki,a federal court held that the
Internet, due to its effective similarity to other traditional instruments
of interstate commerce such as the highway, railroad, or postal
service, falls within the scope of the Commerce Clause. 146 In Edgar
v. MITE Corp., the Supreme Court outlined the 'extraterritoriality
doctrine. ' 147 This means that the Commerce Clause precludes the
application of a state statute to commerce that takes place wholly
outside of the state's borders, whether or not the commerce has
effects within the state. Furthermore, according to the decision in
Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., even if a state law regulates evenhandedly
and does not directly discriminate, it can still violate the Clause if it
imposes a burden of interstate commerce which is clearly excessive in
relation to the putative local benefits. 48 Given these stringent
restrictions, it is hardly surprising that two state laws regulating spain
have fallen afoul of the dormant Commerce Clause.
The state laws in question were those of Washington and
California and they were found to be unconstitutional respectively, in
State of Washington v. Hecke1149 and Ferguson v. Friendfinders,
Inc. 50 In both instances, the lower courts offered no analysis and
neither opinion revealed the court's reasoning-the orders were brief
and to the effect that the respective laws were unduly restrictive and
burdensome of interstate commerce. Following the decisions in
Heckel and Ferguson, it became apparent that any state regulation of
spain could be struck down, and the fact that federal legislation was
urgently required to fill the void was pointed out by many
commentators.151
However, both cases have recently been
successfully appealed, restoring the law to its former state. The
Washington Supreme Court, in State v. Heckel,'5 2 in upholding the
constitutional validity of Washington's Commercial Electronic Mail
Act found that:
The Act limits the harm that deceptive commercial e-mail causes
Washington businesses and citizens. The Act prohibits e-mail

146.

Am. Libraries Ass'n v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).

147.

Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 641-42 (1982).

148.

Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).

149.
State of Washington v. Heckel , No. 98-2-25480-7 SEA (Wash. Sup. Ct. 2000) (order
on civil motion granting defendant's summary judgment).
150.
Ferguson v. Friendfinders, Inc., 94 Cal. App. 4th 1255, 155 Cal. Rptr. 2d 258 (2002)
(order sustaining
defendant's demurrer without leave to amend) available at

ttp://www.spamlaws.com/cases/ferguson.html.
151.

Kelin, supra note 53, at 435.

152.

State v. Heckel, 24 P.3d 404 (2001).
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solicitors from using misleading information in the subject line or
transmission path of any commercial e-mail message sent to
Washington residents or from a computer located in Washington.
We find that the local benefits of the Act outweigh any
conceivable burdens the Act places on those sending commercial
e-mail messages.153
This reasoning was followed by the Californian appellate court
in Ferguson v. Friendfinders,Inc. as recently as January of 2002, a
decision which reinstated section 17538.4
of the California Business
54
and Professions Code as good law.
In one way, it seems to be a shame that the courts in Heckel and
Ferguson found the state laws to be constitutional, as the decisions
have removed the urgent need for a federal law on spam. Instead, the
onus will now be shifted back on to state legislatures to act in the
absence of a nationwide law and the uncertain legal status of spain in
the U.S. will be maintained. Some U.S. commentators, such as R.
Geissler, have argued that there is no need for a separate, general antispain law as private civil actions, self-regulatory mechanisms and 'the
156
marketplace of ideas' 155 are adequate responses already in existence
The author would criticize this approach on two grounds. First, the
current growth of spam and its persistent proliferation is evidence
enough of the failure of currently available legal remedies to the
problem. As well as this, Geissler's argument could be criticized for
perpetuating the piecemeal approach to finding a solution to the junk
mail problem that has thus far been applied in the U.S.. What is
needed is a broad and structured legislative framework, comprising
effective federal legislation as well as the continued, but limited, use
of common law private civil actions.

IV. EUROPEAN LEGAL APPROACHES TO UNSOLICITED COMMERCIAL
E-MAIL
A.

Legislative Regulation: The EuropeanDirectives

The legal approach adopted in Europe to deal with the issue of
spai has been primarily one of legislating at an EU level. This is in
contrast to the stance adopted in the U.S., where the law is heavily

153.
154.
155.
L., art. 8
156.

Id. at 413.
Ferguson, 94 Cal. App. 4th 1255.
R. Jonas Geissler, Whether Anti-Span Laws Violate the FirstAmendment, J. ONLINE
(2001).
Id. at

37.
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reliant on private civil actions and industry self-regulatory measures,
and is thus in line with the general approaches taken in both
jurisdictions in dealing with the "evolving legal landscape" that is
developing alongside the new information technologies.157 This may
be due to societal or sociological reasons, but it is more likely due, in
part at least, to an absence of technical knowledge on the part of
European decision-makers with regard to emerging technologies of
which one hears frequent, if anecdotal, reference to. Whatever the
reason, the European debate on spain has been, if not an uninformed,
certainly a limited one, and the resulting proposals for legislation
have been focused almost primarily on the issue of whether to adopt
an EU-wide 'opt-out' or 'opt-in' scheme. The former requires the
establishment or existence of a central opt-out register which would
be consulted by e-marketers on a regular basis, while the latter system
would involve the prohibition of unsolicited e-mail advertising
without the prior consent of the consumer addressed. Although an
opt-in scheme would seem to accord with the traditional values of
privacy that are associated with many European countries, many
parties believe that such a system may leave EU member states out in
the cold as regards the development of the e-commerce sector and the
Information Society as a whole. For example, this is what the
Parliamentary Committee on Citizens' Freedoms and Rights, Justice
and Home Affairs had to say regarding the inclusion of an opt-in
scheme in the proposed Electronic Communications Data Protection
Directive:
The opt-out system will promote e-commerce in Europe, one of the
major objectives of the eEurope initiative. The opt-in system will
be a barrier to the same and will help encourage direct marketing
companies to set up their business outside the European Union,
where the legislative framework allows the opt-out for direct
marketing purposes.158
The European Economic and Social Committee 59 and the
Committee on Legal Affairs and the Internal Market1 60 made similar
157. See Valentine, supranote 42.
158. Proposal for a European Parliament and Council Directive Concerning the Processing
of Personal Data and and the Protection of Privacy in the Electronic Communications Sector,
EUR. PAR. Doc. (COM (2000) 385 final-2000/0189 (COD)) 31 (2000).
159. Jan. 24, 2001 opinion at http://www.esc.eu.int (last visited Feb. 14, 2003).
160. Committee on Legal Affairs and Internal Market Draft Opinion on the Proposal for a
Council Directive on Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council
Concerning the Processing of Personal Data and the Protection of Privacy in the Electronic
Communications Sector, EUR. PARL. DOc. (COM 2000) 385-C5-0439-2000/0189(COD) 10
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remarks in their submissions on the same debate. However, it appears
that the Commission has adopted quite a different stance.
One of the limitations of a legislative solution to spain is, as
Sorkin notes, the legitimization of it.161 If a partial solution to spain is
effected i.e. regulation without prohibition, the stigma previously
attached to the medium will begin to erode. The result, depending of
course on what type of regulation is put in place, will be an increased
use of "direct e-mail marketing" by mainstream companies and a
likely increase in the net costs to individual e-mail users. A 2001
Commission report on unsolicited commercial communications and
data protection makes reference to the distinction between the rude
and aggressive form of e-mail marketing that has become known as
spain, and the potentially legitimate opt-in strategy, known as
permission marketing.' 62 It appears to this author that the current
strategy of the Commission as regards unsolicited commercial e-mail
is to remove the "spammers" from the equation, leaving room for
permission marketing to take seed and e-commerce to grow. This
point is worth bearing in mind through the following examination of
the development of substantive law through several EU directives,
certain provisions of which either directly or indirectly regulate the
sending of unsolicited commercial e-mail.
1. The Data Protection Directive
The Data Protection Directive,163 though it makes no reference to
unsolicited commercial e-mail, may nonetheless have indirect legal
repercussions regarding the practice of spamming. The UK Data
Protection Act (1998), the statute that transposes the Directive into
UK national law, defines "personal data" as "data which relates to a
living individual who can be identified: from those data; or from
those data and other information which is in the possession of, or is
likely to come into the possession of, the data controller."' 64 For this

(2001), available at

http://www.europarl.eu.int/meetdocs/committees/juri/20010529/435773en.pdf.
161.
Sorkin, supra note 28, at 382- 83.
162. European Commission, Report on Unsolicited Commercial Communications and
Data Protection 98 (2001), availableat
http://europa.eu.int/comm/internalmarket/en/dataprot/studies/spamstudyen.pdf.
163. Directive 95/46/EC on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of
Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, 1995 O.J. (L281) 31,
http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal-market/privacy/docs/95-46-ce/dirl 995-46part _en.pdf and
http://europa.eu.int/comm/intemalmarket/privacy/docs/95-46-ce/dirl 995-46_part2_en.pdf.
164.

Data Protection Act, 1998, c.29, § 1.
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discussion, the question arises as to whether individuals may be
identified from their e-mail address and, therefore, whether the data
procession provisions apply. The short answer is that, on the surface,
it may depend on the particular address in question. For example, this
author could easily be identified from the (fictitious) e-mail address
"john.magee@qub.ac.uk," since any person viewing that address
could trace the author to the Queen's University in Belfast and
quickly identify him. The same applies to corporate domain names,
which in fact, may be even easier to trace. However, it would seem
that different considerations apply to an address like
"jonner@yahoo.com," which gives no geographical location or useful
information other than the fact that the data subject may call himself
'jonner' and that he maintains a Yahoo! e-mail account. Even so, it
has been reported that the current Data Protection Commissioner,
Elizabeth France, has given a strong indication that she regards all email addresses as personal data for the purposes of the 1998 Act. The
theory behind this view is that regardless of the anonymous nature of
many e-mail addresses, because they are unique to individual users,
an electronic record may be built up about a given person. Further
consideration applies when dealing with what is termed sensitive
personal data. Section 2 of the 1998 Act defines this as data relating
to:
the racial or ethnic origin of the subject; his political opinions; his
religious beliefs or other beliefs of a similar nature; whether he is a
member of a trade union; his physical mental health or condition;
his sexual life commission or alleged commission by him of any
offence of any proceedings for any offence committed or alleged to
have been committed by him, the disposal of such proceedings or
the sentence of any court in such proceedings. 165
Addresses along the lines of "billdoherty@workersparty.ie" or
even "sarahsmyth@christianscience.org" arguably fall into this
category, whereby the explicit consent of the data subject would be
required before the processing of such information could take place.
As regards the requisite treatment of personal data, Article 7 of
the Directive states that such data be collected fairly, for specified,
explicit and legitimate purposes and processed in a fair and lawful
manner in line with the stated purposes. Crucially, Article 14(6)
requires that an individual should be given the opportunity to object
165.
Stephen Groom & Osborne Clarke, A Legal Voyage Round Unsolicited Commercial
E-Mail, May 4, 2000, available at http://www.marketinglaw.co.uk upon free subscription.
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to the use of their personal data for direct marketing purposes and
must be informed if their data is being disclosed to a third party direct
marketer. Given these provisions, it could be argued that spamming
in its current form i.e. involving the use of "harvesting" software to
collect e-mail addresses from public Web sites and indiscriminately emailing those addresses and/or sell the mailing lists to third parties is
forbidden by the Data Protection Directive. However, practical
considerations of enforcement dictate that the Directive does not
outlaw spamming, but instead should be viewed as a requirement for
a degree of openness about the processing of e-mail addresses1 66 and,
as such, an important first move toward the fair and legitimate form
of permission marketing that is envisaged for the future.
2. The Distance Selling Directive
Article 10 of this directive 16 was the first EU law provision that
came close to directly regulating spain, but without actually
specifically mentioning it. Article 10(1) requires the prior consent of
the consumer in the case of unsolicited commercial contact by fax or
automated calling machine. Article 10(2) goes on to state that other
means of distance communication which allow for individual
communication may only be used where there is no clear objection
from the user. This article has been interpreted as meaning that an
opt-in scheme (prior consent of the consumer) is required for fax and
automated calls while an opt-out mechanism (no clear objection from
the consumer) will suffice for other communication channels.' 68 It is
interesting that e-mail was not mentioned under either heading as it
did exist at the time of the adoption of the Directive, just as spain was
becoming a serious problem. Lloyd believes the omission is simply
due to the fact that the Directive was first drafted back in 1992,169
while Schaub opines that it may have been so drafted to keep the
provision technology neutral. 170 Another possibility is that the
legislature was unable at that point in time to reach a consensus on the
166.

Schaub, supra note 11, at 101.

167.
Directive 97/7/EC on the Protection of Consumers in Respect of Distance Contracts,
1997 O.J. (L144) 19,
http://europa.eu.int/comm/consumers/policy/developments/dist-sell/dist
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For an Interpretation of the Consumer Protection (Distance Selling) Regulations 2000
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(SI 2000 No. 2334) which implement the 1997 EU Directive, see Aron Youngerwood &
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& TECH.
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issue and so left open all possibilities for another day.
The opt-out regime referred to in Article 10(2) was not fleshed
out any further, giving rise to a couple of possible mechanisms.
Either a consumer could respond directly to every unsolicited
message or an opt-out register, such as those established by the DMA,
could be created. Aside from the direct marketers themselves, few
people are happy with the notion of an opt-out register, be it one
general register, or a collection of a number of registers grouped
according to product/service orientation. Fisher correctly points out
the possibility of opt-out lists being abused by unscrupulous lowvolume spammers. "The public opt-out list is a singularly dangerous
alternative. It might actually do more harm than good, because it
list of valid e-mail addresses available to
would make an 'enormous
171
the entire world.

The implicit creation of an opt-out regime for unsolicited e-mail
by the Distance Selling Directive, without proper consideration for
the practical concerns of implementation, the author would regard as
being an irresponsible attempt by the legislature to be seen to be
regulating a problem but, in actual fact, side-stepping the real issues.
3. The Telecommunications Directive
Along very similar lines to Article 10 of the Distance Selling
Directives, Article 12(1) of the Telecommunications Directive forbids
the use of automated dialing or fax machines for the purposes of
direct marketing without the prior consent of the consumer.1 72 The
enigmatic Article 12(2) refers to "calls made by other means of
communication" and gives Member States two options as regards
implementing the law for these calls. 173 Calls are not allowed: (1)
without the subscriber's consent; or (2) in respect of subscribers who
do not wish to receive these calls. 174 Once again, e-mail is not
referred to and, in terms of interpreting Article 12(2), it would seem
difficult to view the word "calls" as referring to anything other than
telephone calls, presumably those made by human operators. The two
regulatory options listed reveal themselves only on close inspection,

171.

Fisher, supranote 28, at 411-12.

172. Council Directive 97/66/EC of 15 December 1997 Concerning the Processing of
Personal Data and the Protection of Privacy in the Telecommunications Sector, 1998 O.J. (L 24)
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173.
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and refer to opt-in and opt-out regimes respectively.
However, in spite of the presence of the term "calls," four
Member States (Austria, Denmark, Finland and Italy), in
implementing the Directive into their respective national laws, chose
to include e-mail marketing within the scope of Article 12(2) and did
so in terms of an opt-in approach. The discussion regarding spam
was further thrown open when the working party, installed by Article
29 of the Data Protection Directive, gave its opinion that the
telecommunications legal framework should apply to e-mail
communications as well as to the other listed forms of
communication. 175 The fact that the other Member States interpreted
the term 'calls' quite literally and thus excluded e-mail solicitation
from the application of the Directive, left EU law in an unharmonized
state. The Commission decided to act, drawing up a proposal for a
new directive concerning the processing of personal data and the
protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector. 176 In
the meantime, another Directive was reaching its final stages.
4. The E-Commerce Directive
The E-Commerce Directive became the first piece of EU
legislation
to explicitly refer to unsolicited
commercial
communication by e-mail regarding the negative consequences of
spam. 177
Recital 30 states that "[t]he sending of unsolicited
commercial communications by electronic mail may be undesirable
for consumers and information society service providers and may
disrupt the smooth functioning of interactive networks. 178 Article 7
provides that "Member States shall lay down in their legislation that
unsolicited commercial communication by electronic mail must be
clearly and unequivocally identifiable as such as soon as it is received
by the recipient."
This provision, effectively a requirement for
labeling, is an important one as it is the first legal provision
emanating from the EU which attempts to tackle the spain problem
head on. However, as Lloyd points out, and as has been previously
indicated here, labeling requirements are only effective as part of an
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Opinion 2/2000 of 3 February 2000 Concerning the General Review of the
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automatic filtering process if the labels used are universal. Because
here they are not, the provision is only effective in helping users to
nominally eliminate junk mail-by which time the damage has been
done and the costs have been incurred.179 While leaving Member
States free to adopt the opt-in regime within their own national
jurisdictions, Article 7(2) goes on to state that "Member States shall
take measures to ensure that service providers undertaking unsolicited
commercial communications by e-mail consult regularly and respect
the opt-out registers in which national persons not wanting to receive
such commercial communications can register themselves."'' 80 This
provision contains a couple of problems with regard to the opt-out
registers mentioned in it. The first is that they do not, in any real
sense, exist-nor did they at the time of the adoption of the Directive.
Perhaps the legislature envisaged that such registers would come into
being upon transposition of the Directive into national law and
maintained by a government body, such as the Department of
Industry and Trade in the UK. The likelihood of the EU giving
legislative authority to any private sector registers, such as those of
the Direct Marketing Associations is unlikely given the problems
associated with such schemes, as previously outlined. The other
concern involving Article 7(2) is that the opt-out registers, if they
were established, need only be consulted regularly, as opposed to very
often or prior to the sending of an e-mail. 18 1 These concerns, when
augmented to the problems associated with opt-out regimes generally
(as discussed under the section reviewing the Distance Selling
Directive), amount to a considerable argument against the opt-out
approach seemingly favored by the legislature and evidenced, in this
Directive, by the very formulation of the requirements.
The UK Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) considered the
opt-in/opt-out argument in its second consultation paper on the
implementation of the Distance Selling Directive at about the same
time that the E-Commerce Directive was being finished.18 While the
DTI is clearly uncertain as to which approach to put its voice behind,
the balance of the argument seemingly falls on the side of opt-in, as
the draft implementing regulation in the paper made provision for an
opt-in regime, with an alternative opt-out scheme appended. At this
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point in time, several other European countries, such as Germany and
Sweden, were also wavering between the likely benefits and
disadvantages of the two regulatory approaches on offer and, by the
time the Council of Ministers sat down to discuss a proposal for a
Directive on data and privacy protection in the
electronic
183
communications sector, the issue had yet to be resolved.
5. The Electronic Communications Privacy Directive
The Electronic Communications Privacy Directive, first
presented by the Commission in July 2000,184 has undergone many
changes since its initial proposal. The general aim of the Directive is
to create rules for the use of current and future electronic
communication channels that are technology neutral, ensuring that
different communication methods are regulated in an equivalent
manner. Despite this, the Directive begins by defining different
communication methods, leaving some commentators to ask how
many more such methods will need defining as advances in
technology are made. 85 As if progress were trying to prove a point, a
new mode of electronic communication, Short Messaging Service
(SMS), which allows communication between mobile phones, came
on to the scene during the adoption of the Directive. The legislature
seemed to view SMS technology as falling somewhere between
telephone and e-mail, and elected to include unsolicited
communications by SMS within the opt-in approach. As regards
unsolicited commercial e-mail, the initial proposal sought to uphold
the status quo, i.e. that the individual Member States could elect
between the opt-in and opt-out approaches, and this draft was
accepted by the Parliament in their first reading of the proposal.
However, when the Council of Ministers met again in December
2001, a massive change had occurred, whereby a compulsory opt-in
approach for unsolicited commercial e-mail was put forward. The
rationale for this approach is explained in Recital 40 of the new
Directive:
183. Before discussion on the Electronic Communications Privacy Directive, another
directive, concerning the distance marketing of consumer financial services, was adopted. Once
again, e-mail was implicitly mentioned (in Art. 10) but the directive simply upheld the status quo
i.e. that Member States could elect whether to adopt an opt-in or an opt-out approach.
184. Commission Proposal on Protection of Privacy, supra note 13.
An agreed
abbreviated term for the Directive has not yet emerged and a number of terms are in use. For
example, Groom & Clarke refer to it as the 'Communications Data Protection Directive,'
Schaub makes reference to the 'Data Protection Directive,' while EuroCAUCE are terming it
the 'E-Privacy Directive.' Schaub, supra note 11, at 103.
185. See, e.g., Schaub, supra note 11, at 103.
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Safeguards should be provided for subscribers against intrusion of
their privacy by unsolicited communications for direct marketing
purposes in particular by means of automated calling machines,
telefaxes, and e-mails, including SMS messages. These forms of
unsolicited commercial communications may on the one hand be
relatively easy and cheap to send and on the other may impose a
burden and/or cost on the recipient. Moreover, in some cases their
volume may also cause difficulties for electronic communications
networks and terminal equipment. For such forms of unsolicited
communications for direct marketing, it is justified to require that
prior explicit consent of the recipients is obtained before such
communications are addressed to them. The single market requires
a harmonized approach to ensure simple, Community-wide rules
for businesses and users.186
The pan-European opt-in approach was hailed as a great victory
by anti-spain activists and dealt a devastating blow to direct
marketers. However, by the time the draft Directive underwent a
second reading by the Parliament and was passed on May 30, 2002,
two significant exceptions to the opt-in regime had been made,
leaving the legal approach to span as what has been termed a
"modified opt-in" or "soft opt-in" approach. 187 The opt-in regime is
created by Article 13(1) which states that "The use of automated
calling systems without human intervention (automatic calling
machines), facsimile machines (fax) or electronic mail for the
purposes of direct marketing may only be allowed in respect of
subscribers who have given their prior consent." ""' 88 ....
The first
exception is created by Article 13(2):
Notwithstanding paragraph 1, where a natural or legal person
obtains from its customers their electronic contact details for
electronic mail, in the context of the sale of a product or a service,
in accordance with Directive 95/46/EC, the same natural or legal
person may use these electronic contact details for direct marketing
of its own products or services, provided that customers clearly
and distinctly are given the opportunity to object, free of charge
and in an easy manner, such use of electronic contact details when
they are collected and on the occasion of each message in case the
customer has not initially refused such use.189
The second exception is to the effect that if the entity that

186.
187.
188.
189.

EC Common Position 26/2000, recital 40.
Groom & Clarke, supra note 165.
Second draft of 26/2000, art. 13(1).
Id.at art. 13(2).

372 COMPUTER & HIGH TECHNOLOGYLA WJOURNAL [Vol. 19

receives the telephone bill for the line, on which the e-mail address is
held, is other than a natural person, the modified opt-in approach does
not apply. This means that if a company or partnership pays for a
telephone connection, Member States retain the choice to apply an
opt-out system. It should be noted that the new Directive imposes a
duty on Member States to ensure that the legitimate interests of
subscribers other than natural persons with regard to unsolicited
communications are protected.
What is most noteworthy about the first exception created by
Article 13(2) is that it allows a company to e-mail consumers whose
address it obtained in the context of a sale. A previous draft had
referred to "the context of a purchase." This change was effected to
avoid the situation arising where marketers could argue that although
no sale took place, a consumer could be included under the 'opt-out'
heading as they had expressed an interest in purchasing a product.
Such information could be obtained by way of a cookie,
demonstrating that the individual had accessed particular parts of a
Web site. Perhaps to act as a counterbalance for this measure, the
original wording of Article 13(2) was altered from reading ...
for
direct marketing of its own products of services of a similar
category," to simply "direct marketing of its own products or
services."' 190 This alteration will somewhat appease commercial Web
sites that offer for a wide variety of goods and services for sale. A
further amendment removed the requirement that the e-mail address
needs to be obtained directly from the customer in question. This
omission, though its full repercussions are unclear, would seem to
indicate that a manufacturer or wholesaler who has obtained an e-mail
address from the retailer who made the sale, may regard the e-mail
address as being that of one of its own customers. As well as these
provisions, Article 13(4) restates that the practice of disguising or
concealing the identity of the sender is forbidden, and that a valid
address to which a customer may request the cessation of
communications must be supplied.
On the whole, the modified opt-in approach prescribed by the
Electronic Communications Privacy Directive should be welcomed as
a sensible regulatory solution to the problem of unsolicited
commercial e-mail. By means of this approach, the EU legislative
has attempted, and in this author's view has succeeded in striking an
acceptable balance between the rights of individual e-mail users to be
free of the cost and nuisance associated with spam, and the legitimate
190.

Groom & Clarke, supra note 165.
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interest of a commercial enterprise in using modem means of
instantaneous communication to promote goods and services to its
own customers and a receptive audience. The only criticism of the
Directive would relate to the exception created as regards its nonapplicability to e-mail received by companies and corporations.
Although the legislation is obviously attempting to allow for
unsolicited, business-to-business commercial communications to
continue, it would be surprising if the large majority of such e-mails
received in the future were not of the usual pornographic, weight loss,
and get-rich-quick nature, received by ordinary office workers at their
desks. In this regard, the DTI and other government bodies in the UK
should seriously consider adopting an opt-in approach in relation to
all unsolicited commercial e-mail, regardless of who pays the
telephone bill. The Directive's provisions, assuming there are no
obstacles to its adoption, should become law in all EU Member States
by October 2003.
B. Non-EU Legal Approaches to Spam in the UK
Due to the existence of the substantial legal framework in place
at the EU level as described above, the need for common law causes
of action to deal with spam in the UK does not seem pressing, to say
the least. However, given the right set of circumstances, a UK-based
ISP may wish to bring a private suit on the basis of trespass for the
purposes of receiving an order for damages. Such private causes of
action may also arise during the time between the adoption of the
Electronic Communications Directive and its implementation in UK
national law.
Unsolicited commercial e-mail litigation in the UK has not
proved to be fertile ground - to date, there have been no judgments
recorded in UK courts on the issue. 19 1 The closest we have come to a
written judgment was in April 1999, when VirginNet issued a writ
against Adrian Paris, a businessman and president of Prophoto UK,
who allegedly sent over 250,000 unsolicited e-mail advertisements
from his VirginNet account.' 92 According to the writ, Paris' alleged
activities had generated over 1,500 complaints by VirginNet
191.
Despite this, a London-based Internet company has been successful in suing a U.S.
spammer. In Bibliotech Ltd. v. Khuri, the UK plaintiff received judgment against the defendants
for spamming and was awarded damages and costs. Bibliotech Ltd. v. Khuri, CV-1344-WBH
(N.D. Ga. 1999). See Sean Fleming, Spare War Victory for BiblioTech, THE REGISTER, Mar. 29,
2000, available at http://www.register.co.uk/content/archive/I 0051 .html.
192.
Andrew Craig, Virgin Spammer Settles Out of Court, VNUNET.COM, May 26, 1999,
available at http://www.vnunet.com/News/83928.
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subscribers and every effort taken by Virgin to control the problem by
closing down Paris' accounts was hampered when the spammer
The case
reopened another account under an assumed name.
subsequently settled with a reported payment of £5,000 to VirginNet
and an agreement that Paris cease his spamming activities.
VirginNet's solicitors were disappointed that an opportunity to set
down the law on spam in the UK had been missed, but explained that
the settlement offer set all the requests of the writ and so was difficult
to refuse.
Had the VirginNet case gone to a full hearing, arguments
alleging trespass to chattels would have been put before the court.
The question arises whether the UK courts would allow for such a
cause of action as has been done in the U.S.. Clerk and Lindsell on
Torts have this to say, "The action of trespass has always been a
remedy affording compensation for injury to a chattel in the
claimant's possession. It lies for any direct and wrongful interference
with possession, and is actionable per se (though the claimant can
also recoverany loss actually suffered). 193
Although the law on trespass in the UK does not differ
dramatically from that in the U.S., a UK court considering the spam
issue would likely review the area de novo. The first issue that arises
is whether or not an ISP's server may be considered as goods or
chattels. In Cox v. Riley, a case brought under the Criminal Damage
Act 1971, section 10 of which defines property as "property of a
tangible nature whether real or personal," this issue arose. 194 There,
the appellant deliberately erased the computer programs from a
printed circuit card which controlled the operation of a computerized
saw. By doing so, the saw could still be used manually but its
practical utility was significantly impaired, and the owner of the saw
incurred the expenditure of "time and effort of a more than minimal
nature."' 195 The court rejected the contention that the appellant's
conduct had merely affected the electronic impulses making up the
program, reasoning that the conduct of Cox had caused impairment of
the equipment, the restoration of which would cause the owner time
and monetary expense. Not only does this decision lend support to the
theory that intangible computer signals can be considered goods if
part of a closed operative circuit, but also that damage can be
evidenced by the significant impairment of the computer-operated
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equipment. It would not be unreasonable for a court to hold, in the
context of unsolicited bulk e-mail, that a large enough volume of
spam could impair an ISP's equipment, leaving it of diminished
value, though it is still functioning. As regards the question of
"wrongful interference," a trespass could only be actionable if the
conduct in question could be considered as being deliberate.
Therefore, if an ISP has informed a spammer that they should cease
their activities and the spamming persists, a cause of action for
trespass could be made out.
Section 3 of the Computer Misuse Act 1990 creates an offense of
unauthorized modification of the contents of any computer which
was, as Chissick and Kelman note, enacted to deal with hackers and
those who planted viruses, and not spammers, who did not exist in
1990.196 However, the section 3 offense would seem to apply to
spamming activities provided the requisite intent and knowledge is
present. The requisite intent is:
An intent to cause a modification of the contents of any computer
and by so doing:
a.

to impair the operation of any computer;

b.

to prevent or hinder access to any program or data held
in any computer; or

c. to impair the operation of 97any such program of the
reliability of any such data. 1
In such cases where a spammer uses a false designation of
origin, such could be used as an indication that the spammer knew
that his conduct would cause the impairment of other computer
equipment. If the CPS brought even one such case it may act as a
significant deterrent to other potential junk mailers.
It has been suggested that spamming could also be construed as
an offense under the 1997 Protection from Harassment Act.1 98 Under
the Act, it is an offense to carry on a course of conduct which
amounts to harassment of another person (this is determined by an
objective test), and the fact that there exists a separate offence of
"putting people in fear of violence" has been cited as an indication
that harassment does not require threats of violence and that a
196.
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criminal or civil case against a "serial spammer" may prove
successful.
As indicated before, such causes of action are speculative in
nature due to the lack of UK case law dealing with unsolicited
commercial mail and may not even be required once the new
European Directive is implemented. However, this author believes
that as the opt-in approach to spam is adopted around Europe and
permission marketing by mainstream companies becomes the norm,
e-mail users and authorities will become less and less tolerant of the
seedier type of e-mail advertisement that is prevalent today and
treated by many, it would seem, as no more than a minor nuisance. If
this change in attitude occurs, the use of criminal sanctions, either
those described above, or in the form of new, specifically tailored
laws against spamming may become an issue.
V.

TECHNICAL APPROACHES TO SPAM AND JURISDICTIONAL ISSUES

Although it would appear that the issues of technical solutions to
spain and the perennial problems thrown up by jurisdiction and the
Internet are unconnected, as the laws relating to spam in various
jurisdictions become more and more disparate, international
regulation of the technical measures adopted to limit spam may prove
to be the only reliable method of controlling transborder unsolicited email. Technical mechanisms may be regarded as a user's first line of
defense against spam and have existed, as discussed earlier, since the
problem of spam first arose. While anti-spam technology is in a
constant state of flux, due to the continued adaptation by spammers
attempting to circumvent it, the various methods used have remained
the same. Spam filtering software remains the most popular, but
efforts in this regard have often had the adverse effect of
inadvertently blocking legitimate e-mail. This is in addition to the
tremendous costs involved in constantly updating the technology as
spammers become more and more familiar with it.
Other technical approaches, in particular the blocking of e-mails
by ISPs with respect to information obtained from spam blacklists,
encounter serious issues with regard to accountability, as has been
previously mentioned. Perhaps the most effective technical solution
to spain has been prevention-ensuring that spammers are unable to
gain access to individual e-mail addresses. Due to the fact that most
mailing lists used for the purposes of direct marketing are generated
using automated harvesting software, the practice of disguising e-mail
addresses by inserting a code that only humans can understand has
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become common. Beke suggests that measures such as inserting the
character string 'nospam' into an e-mail address or providing clues
leading to a personal access code are relatively simple tasks in human
terms but cannot be understood by computational linguists today. 199
e-mail
address
is
example he uses
is: "[An]
The
userid@host.domain.id. Take the name of the continent where I live
(it has seven letters) and reverse it. Now take every other letter,
starting with the first occurrence of 'c'. That's [the] personal access
code. 2 °°
Of course, this type of measure is enormously effective but there
are many instances where the provision of an e-mail address to a
publicly available Web site will simply not be feasible in this format,
and many users would find such evasive techniques overly
cumbersome in any case.
The latest filtering technique to have emerged, and that which
has resulted in the software program SpamAssassin, has involved the
use of open-source software development. The instigators of the
SpanAssassin project note that, unlike other spam filters, the opensource version, by utilizing the fixes of many participants has been
able to take advantage of a combination of filtering techniques instead
of using just one. 20 1 The purpose of spam filtering software such as
SpamAssassin is not to eliminate the problem but merely to contain it.
The rationale behind most technical approaches lies in the erection of
an electronic bulwark that only the most technologically proficient
spainmers will be able to penetrate. As long as spam filters can
eliminate the junk e-mail emanating from the average spanmer, the
problem will remain contained and the law can be left to deal with
those who persist in sending unsolicited e-mail.
The recalcitrance of such spammers seems, at first, difficult to
understand given the existence of so many technical and legal
obstacles. Perhaps, for some, the prospect of a challenge and the
notoriety that comes with success is the driving force but, for the rest,
the motivation is entirely monetary. Spam is big business. Despite
the existence in the literature of articles such as that by Fornichelli (in
which is detailed the calamitous effects that an experimentation with
spam had on magazine editor Erica Shames),20 2 it appears that
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unsolicited e-mail advertising can generate huge profits. The profit
margins of large-scale users of bulk advertising are part of, what one
might term the "dark statistics" of this issue. But in certain instances,
such as litigation or liquidation, the true figures come to light. For
example, Cyber Promotions, the spamming company involved in
many of the important U.S. cases on unsolicited commercial e-mail,
were recording sufficient operating profits to withstand many lost
court battles (including one $2 million payout) before the company
folded. For many smaller scale operators this is motivation enough
and no legal or technical disincentive will be great enough to dissuade
them. As Leonard cheekily puts it, "I have a sneaking suspicion that
a gallows or a guillotine might be the only technology that really has
a hope of deterring spammers. '2 °3
The jurisdictional problems created by the proliferation of
transborder unsolicited e-mail communications represent what may
prove to be an insurmountable hurdle. Despite the best efforts of
many global non-governmental organizations, it seems that the
differences associated with the laws of the jurisdictions of the world
may prove greater than their similarities when it comes to the
proposed global regulation of spam. As unsolicited commercial email touches on so many aspects of the law, for example commerce,
advertising, free speech, libel, intellectual property and the criminal
law, it would prove to be a poor example of an activity to which to
apply a global legally binding framework. Having said this, certain
broad legal approaches and technical protocols could be agreed upon.
In his book, Internet and Electronic Commerce Law in the EU,
John Dickie touches upon the jurisdictional quandary created by the
Internet. In his concluding remarks on the European Community
approach to electronic commerce regulation, he proposes that the
traditional legal framework is an inappropriate one in which to
regulate cyberspace.2 °4 One suggested, alternate model of governance
is the "World Government Model" as outlined by the OECD. 20 5 This
approach would involve the establishment of global rules for ecommerce under the authority of a supra national body. Although
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some global legal frameworks have been suggested by the OECD, °6
the United Nations,20 7 and the International Chamber of Commerce,20 8
such instruments lack the bite of binding legal regulations, regardless
of their impact upon national law. 20 9 Another model put forward for
discussion by the OECD is that of Internet self-regulation termed the
"Brave New World Model. ''2 10 The need for this style of governance
is best explained by Johnson and Post:
Cyberspace radically undermines the relationship between legally
significant (online) phenomena and physical location. The rise of
the global computer network is destroying the link between
geographical location and (1) the power of [the] local
[government] to assert control over online behavior; (2) the effects
of online behaviour on individuals or things; (3) the legitimacy of
[the efforts of] a local [sovereign to enforce rules applicable to]
global phenomena; and (4) the ability
211 of physical location to give
notice of which sets of rules apply.
Although the establishment of the "Brave New World Model"
would be desirable from the point of view of harmonizing current
legal approaches to e-commerce issues, it has been shown in the
context of unsolicited commercial e-mail that such efforts have not
been successful. In this regard, it is perhaps noteworthy to point out
that the groups most vocal in support of self-regulation are often
proponents of direct marketing.
In relation to the "World
Government Model," it would appear that the development of
national legal frameworks with respect to unsolicited commercial email has already surpassed the point beyond which any attempt to
invoke a global from of governance would be practical, or even
desirable. Despite the success enjoyed by international organizations'
efforts to clamp down on international criminal activities such as the
trafficking of child pornography, such joint co-operative enforcement
is unlikely to succeed in the field of e-commerce regulation due to the
heterogeneous nature of the laws in jurisdictions across the world,
206. The OECD Privacy Guidelines in the Electronic Environment, available at
http://www.oecd.org/subject/ecommerce.
207.
U.N. COMM'N ON INT'L TRADE LAW, U.N. MODEL LAW ON ELECTRONIC COMMERCE
(1996), available at http://www.uncitral.org/english/texts/electcom/ml-ecomm.htm.
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209. See generally, Amelia H. Boss, Electronic Commerce and the Symbiotic Relationship
Between Internationaland Domestic Law Reform, 72 TULANE L. REV. 1931 (1998).
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48 STANFORD L. REV. 1370 (1996) (emphasis in original).
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where problems like unsolicited commercial e-mail have already
been, at least, partially regulated." 2
VI. CONCLUSION

As perhaps the most damaging and costly Internet phenomenon
to both individual users and ISPs emerging in recent years, the spam
problem has proved to be persistent and one which is not going away.
The development of the Internet has come a long way since 1994
when Trotter Hardy was able to write that advertisements on the Web
21 3
were not common due to the network's not-for-profit origins.
Today, the World Wide Web is, for the most part, a commercially
driven information and communications tool, and it hardly comes as a
surprise that many companies and individuals have taken advantage
of e-mail in order to promote goods and services at almost no cost.
However attractive a form of publicity this may appear to be to
advertisers, unsolicited advertising by e-mail has caused massive
disruption to the network particularly due to the practice of sending
such e-mails by the million. Individual e-mail users end up paying a
two-fold price for this. First, through the time spent in downloading,
sifting through, deleting, and responding to junk e-mail and secondly,
in terms of the higher access fees that ISPs are forced to charge in
order to cover the costs incurred in upgrading their technology to deal
with the ever increasing volume of spam. Other identifiable problems
include the often-inappropriate content of spam messages, their anticompetitive nature, and the security risks posed.
The need for legal solutions to the problem became clear when,
during the mid-1990s, it became apparent that the self-regulatory and
vigilante methods employed to deal with spam had proved
insufficient to deal with the escalating problem. In the U.S., several
large ISPs litigated against known spanmers and actions brought
under common law trespass, as well as trademark infringement and
breach of contract proved successful in cases of "aggravated
spamming." These are situations where the spammer ignores requests
to halt his activity, uses the domain name of a reputable company, or
forges information in the header of an e-mail in order to circumvent
preventative spam-filtering software. These private causes of action
were augmented by the enactment of extensive U.S. state legislation
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which, despite some constitutional concerns, has remained in force.
To date there remains no federal legislation on the issue of spam in
the U.S. with the consequent problems of a lack of uniformity and
certainty in the law governing it.
By contrast, the legal approach in the EU has been almost
entirely a legislative one, with little or no case law or nationally
originated legislation emerging. The early EU directives which dealt
obliquely with the spain issue sometimes displayed a lack of
comprehension of the underlying technology but this has become less
of an issue as the legislature has attempted to make the law
technology neutral.
The latest and most important legislative development at the EU
level has been the proposed Electronic Communications Privacy
Directive with its modified or soft opt-in approach for unsolicited
commercial e-mail. The directive, by providing for a Europe-wide
opt-in rule with exceptions created for previous customers and
subscribers who are not natural persons, marks the beginning of what
has been termed permission marketing in Europe. Essentially, the
Council of Telecommunications Ministers and the European
Commission, with the support of Parliament, have created a regime
whereby e-mail marketing will be legitimized and used by
mainstream business as a marketing tool. The effectiveness of which
will depend, to some degree at least, upon the extent to which
"spam"-in the form it takes today--can be controlled or eliminated.
In this regard, it would come as no great surprise if pressure came
upon the government to introduce more severe sanctions to deal with
renegade spammers. As already noted, section 3 of the UK 1990
Computer Misuse Act could be interpreted as the basis for a criminal
prosecution for spamming, but it is more likely that new specifically
tailored legislation would be introduced in such an eventuality.
With the European law on spain reasonably clear, focus shifts
back to the U.S.-a nation which originates more spam than all the
others put together-and the uncertain status of the law there. As
with virtually all other laws relating to information technology in
general, and to the Internet in particular, jurisdictional issues create
unique problems. Transborder unsolicited e-mail cannot be dealt with
effectively in terms of traditional legal systems and, as has been
argued, other models of governance such as self-regulatory and supranational approaches themselves throw up different types of problems.
One possible way around these difficulties lie in the coordination of
legal and technical approaches to dealing with spain. Technical
measures employed in the fight against junk e-mail are usually
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focused on the creation of filtering software - software which must be
constantly updated as spammers become familiar with the technology
anld devise ingenious methods of circumventing it. Other preventative
technical measures include the disguising of one's e-mail address
when posting it to public Web space, so that harvesting software used
to gather e-mail addresses for the purposes of spain may not
understand it.
Effective coordination of legal and technical measures is easier
said than done. One way in which this may be achieved is by the
tailoring of technical mechanisms, such as filters, so that one would
be required to break the law in order to get around them. Such a
system would ensure that liability would be easier to establish but
would not, on the face of it, help to control transborder junk mail. In
order to achieve this, filtering software utilizing country top-level
domains would need to be developed. Even this may not go far
enough though as, more often than not, the top-level domain gives no
indication of geographic location such as the more popular mail
servers being global providers such as Yahoo! and Hotmail. Another
option would be the reconfiguration of e-mail protocols, but this
would be an excessively burdensome and costly one. A solution to
the jurisdictional problems associated with unsolicited commercial email seems elusive for the foreseeable future. In the meantime,
European e-mail users and ISPs will have to be content with the
European legislative framework that is in place and hope that this law
will serve as a model for the future enactment of legislation in other
jurisdictions.

